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20 YALE J. L. & TECH. 1 (2018)
The pharmaceutical industry is in a state of
fundamental transition. New drug approvals have slowed,
patents on blockbuster drugs are expiring, and costs
associated with developing new drugs are escalating and
yielding fewer viable drug candidates. As a result,
pharmaceutical firms have turned to a number of
alternative strategies for growth. One of these strategies is
"drug rep urposing"-finding new ways to deploy approved
drugs or abandoned clinical candidates in new disease
areas. Despite the efficiency advantages of repurposing
drugs, there is broad agreement that there is insufficient
repurposing activity because of numerous intellectual
property protection and market failures. This Article
examines the system that surrounds drug repurposing,
including serendipitous discovery, the application of "big
data" methods to prioritize promising repurposing
candidates, the unorthodoxly regulated off-label
prescription practices of providers, and related
prohibitions on pharmaceutical firms' off-label
marketing. The Article argues that there is a complex
ecosystem in place and that additional or disruptive IP
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Drug Repurposing Ecosystem
o r market exclusivity incentives may harm as much as
help in promoting repurposing activity. To illustrate this
threat, the Article traces the trajectory of metformin, a
common diabetes drug that shows promise for conditions
ranging from polycystic ovary syndrome to breast cancer.
From the initial reasons for Bristol-Myers Squibb to
refuse to invest in promising alternative uses, to the
institutions, researchers, and regulators who identified
possibilities for metformin treatment, this Article aims to
map the role of intellectual property protection, market
exclusivity, and search for capital that led to metformin's
ascent as a repurposed drug. The Article contributes a
concrete understanding to an important problem in
pharmaceutical law and policy, one for which scholars
have quickly suggested more powerful patent and market
exclusivity protection when doing so may undermine the
very processes now leading to effective alternative uses for
existing drugs.
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INTRODUCTION
After applying a sophisticated algorithm to screen 6,000
compounds either approved by the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) or far along in clinical development,
researchers from two U.S. universities and the National
Institutes of Health found existing drug compounds that can
stop the Zika virus both from replicating in the body and from
damaging fetal brain cells that lead to birth defects in
newborns. 2 One of the drugs, niclosamide, is already on the
market as a treatment for tapeworm. 3 The breakthrough is part
of a trend in the development trajectory of new medicines:
instead of developing new small molecule compounds, with their
associated long approval timelines and high rates of failure,
researchers are turning to already-approved medications in the
hope that rapidly advancing computer analysis techniques may
match information from existing compounds to diseases in need
of new treatments. Separate studies suggest that niclosamide
may be effective in treating cancer as well as methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), a bacterium resistant
to most antibiotics
Of course, just because niclosamide shows promise at the
cellular level does not necessarily mean that it would be
effective (or at what dosage) at treating Zika if humans actually
used it for that purpose. Nor does it resolve, given the possibility
that it would be prescribed to pregnant women, additional safety
concerns particular to them. 4 In order for niclosamide to be
approved, expensive clinical trials must be undertaken and the
regulatory process for its alternative use approved by FDA. If
niclosamide were new, the normal mechanism that would cover
clinical trial and other development costs would be the patent
system: the original patent holder-Bayer-would be able to
charge high prices on the drug, license the compound to others,
2 See Miao Xu, et. al., Identification of Small Molecule Inhibitors of Zika Virus Infection
and Induced Neural Cell Death via a Drug Repurposing Screen, 22 NATURE MED. 1101,
1101 (2016).
3 Kathleen Haughney, FSU Research Team Makes Zika Drug Breakthrough, FSU NEWS
(Aug. 29, 2016), http://news.fsu.edu/news/science -technology/2016/08/29/fsu-research-
team-makes-zika-drug-breakthrough/ [https://perma.cc/5DP2-L6YN].
4 Although there are no controlled studies supporting use by pregnant women during
pregnancy, animal studies have revealed no evidence of harm to the fetus. See




or sell rights to the patent until the patent expired, at which
time generic manufacturers would enter the market and the
price would decline by ninety percent or more. 5 But, niclosamide
was patented in the U.S. in 1960.6 If the patent had already
expired by the time of the drug's approval, then Bayer, which
had received approval by FDA to market niclosamide under the
trade name Niclocide, would be able to rely upon "regulatory"
exclusivity, or the five-year period granted for new small
molecule medicines. But, niclosamide was first approved by FDA
on May 14, 1982. 7 So, with no ability to recover clinical
investments through the patent system or through special
regulatory exclusivity, who would pay to prove that this
promising, already-approved treatment might save unborn
children from severe birth defects and lifelong disability?
This problem-what Rebecca Eisenberg calls the "problem of
new uses"-has vexed firms, legislators and regulators for most
of the last decade.8 The 21st Century Cures Act, one of the last
laws signed by President Obama, contained provisions
applicable to new uses of existing drugs up until the last
legislative session, when the major parties could not reach an
agreement. 9 The provisions applicable to new uses had been
circulating in Congress for five years or more. 10
In reality, the debate over new uses for existing drugs has
not arisen because of public health threats like Ebola or Zika,
but rather because pharmaceutical firms face a fundamental
transformation of their business model.11 While expenditures on
5 See Price Declines After Medicines Lose Exclusivity in the U.S., IMS INST. FOR
HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS 2 (2016),
https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/IMSH%/ 201nstitute/Healthcare%/ 20Briefs/Price
Declines after Branded Medicines Lose Exclusivity.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CC4-
CRCJ] (providing evidence of price reduction in a drug after generic entry).
6 U.S. Patent No. 3,079,297 (filed May 31, 1960).
7 Niclocide (Niclosamide) Product Details, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. Orange Book,
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/results product.cfm?Appl Type=N&Ap
pl No=018669 [https://perma.cc/S6XC-TVXS].
8 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
717, 717-18 (2005).
9 See Juliet Eilperin & Carolyn Y. Johnson, Obama, Paying Tribute to Biden and
Bipartisanship, Signs 21st Century Cures Act Tuesday, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2016)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/12/13/obama-paying-
tribute-to-biden-and-bipartisanship -signs-2 1st -century-cures-act -
tuesday/?utm term=.3c6cf7dc6b7e [https://perma.cc/9JM6-PKS3].
10 See, e.g., MODDERN Cures Act, H.R. 3497, 112th Cong. (2011).
11 See lain Cockburn, Is the Pharmaceutical Industry in a Productivity Crisis?, in
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1 (Lerner & Stern eds., 2007); Kristopher Hult
and Tomas Philipson, Should Investors Pay Attention to the Alleged Productivity
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pharmaceutical research and development have accelerated
rapidly over the last several years, the number of drug
approvals, including new molecular entities and new biologics,
has declined steadily since the mid-1990s. During the period
from 1978 to 1980, the average number of the FDA category of
new molecular entities was forty-three. By the period from 1998
to 2000, the average number had dropped to thirty-three. 12 That
number fell to twenty-two between 2005 and 2010, although
approvals have edged up in recent years as a result of
accelerated regulatory pathways. 13 Of approvals, however,
roughly half offered therapeutic qualities similar to an already
approved drug. 14 In the same period, research and development
investments, as reported by member firms of the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(PhRMA), increased from $8.4 billion per year in 1990 to $48.6
billion in 2011.15 As a consequence of modest new approvals,
new patented products are not replacing revenues supported by
patents expiring on existing drugs. 16 Moreover, the return from
each new drug has declined. 17 The growing reach and strength of
insurance firms and pharmaceutical benefit management
companies has further pressured pharmaceutical firms' profit
margins. 18
The financial pressures facing pharmaceutical firms have
resulted in both internal and external reorganizations.
Pharmaceutical firms are now far more likely either to outsource
12 A. Demain and J. Spizek, The Antiobiotic Crisis, in ANTIMICROBIAL DRUG DISCOVERY
29 (George Tegos & Eleftherios Mylonakis eds., 2012).
13 Summary of NDA Approvals & Receipts, 1938 to the Present, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN. (Jan. 18, 2013),
https://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/productregulation/summaryofndaapp
rovalsreceipts l938tothepresent/default.htm [http://perma.cc/]RQK2 -YER8].
14 Ehna Petrova, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Industry: The Process of Drug
Discovery and Development, in INNOVATION AND MARKETING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 23-24 (Stefan Stremersch & Min Ding eds. 2013) ("Notably, more than half
of the new brands of drugs introduced in 2010 were not novel chemical entities or
biopharmaceuticals, but improved versions and altered formulations.").
15 See 2015 Profile, PHRMA 2 (Apr. 2015), http://phrma-
docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015 phrma profile.pdf [http://perma.cc/NZ3Z-
3SLX].
16 Mark Kessel, The Problem with Today's Pharmaceutical Business An Outsider's
View, 29 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 27, 27 (2011) ("Blockbuster drugs are coming off
patent or being taken off the market for safety reasons and there are no replacement
drugs on the horizon to make up the shortfall in profits."); Andrew Jack, Pharma
Tries to Avoid Falling Off "Patent Cliff," FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 6, 2012),
https://www.ft.com/content/572ea510-9452-1 lel-bb47-00144feab49a
[https://perma.cc/V5LD-E3KB].
17 Ernst R. Berndt et al., Decline in Economic Returns from New Drugs Raises Questions
About Sustaining Innovations, 34 HEALTH AFF. 245, 251-52 (2015).
18 Id.
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one of the major expenses of drug development-clinical trials-
to contract research organizations (CROs) or to undertake trials
in less expensive jurisdictions. 19 The industry has also
consolidated to achieve cost synergies. Of the forty-two members
of PhRMA active in 1988, only eleven remain today. 20 Major
pharmaceutical firms are also using acquisition of highly
specialized biotechnology firms to open access to new products.
Since 1994, GlaxoSmithKline and Sanofi have undertaken,
respectively, over $78 billion and $100 billion in acquisitions and
have made explicit, public announcements about targeting
smaller biotechnology firms. 21 Pharmaceutical firms are also
shifting their investment priorities, on the one hand becoming
as much marketing and sales firms as research firms and on the
other directing more research dollars toward biologics, or
therapies derived from living organisms. 22 The former
investment allows pharmaceutical firms to capture off-patent
revenues diminished by competition from generics firms. The
latter investment is promising from a medical standpoint, but
also a more difficult market for generics firms to enter.23
Among the strategies that have emerged as pharmaceutical
industry innovation, financing, and organization transforms is
investment in finding new ways to use approved drugs or
abandoned clinical candidates. 24 Drug repurposing-also known
as repositioning, reusing, or rediscovery-is an attractive option
19 Editorial Board, Sponsorship, Authorship, and Accountability, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED.
825, 825 (2001) ("Over the past few years CROs have received the lion's share of
clinical-trial revenues. For example, in 2000 in the United States, CROs received 60
percent of the research grants from pharmaceutical companies, as compared with only
40 percent for academic trialists.").




22 Kessel, supra note 16 ("The traditional business model at big pharma relies on (i)
identifying promising new blockbuster drugs; (ii) conducting large, expensive clinical
trials; and (iii) if successful, promoting the drugs with extensive marketing and sales
presence in developed countries."); Steve Brozak, Big Pharma Learned the Wrong
Marketing Lesson, FORBES (May 25, 2014),
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/welcome/?toURL=https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephen
brozak/2013/05/25/big-pharma-learned-the-wrong-marketing-lesson
[https://perma.cc/E6PX-W4HR] ("In the past several years, big pharma companies
have also begun advertising directly to consumers on television and in print, telling
potential patients, 'ask your doctor' to prescribe a variety of powerful medicines that
can often have multiple and potentially dangerous side-effects.").
23 Benjamin P. Falit et al., Biosimilar Competition in the United States: Statutory
Incentives, Payers, and Pharmacy Benefit Managers, 34 HEALTH AFF. 294, 294-295
(2015).
24 Ann M. Thayer, Drug Repurposing, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Oct. 1, 2012, at
15, 15.
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for several reasons. 25 Repurposing requires shorter cycle times,
sometimes only one-third the time required for new drug
development and approval. 26 Traditional drug development
usually requires twelve to fifteen years. 27 Repurposing is much
faster, taking only three to twelve years.28 Many of the drugs
subject to repurposing investigations can also go directly to
precinical testing and clinical trials.29 Second, drug repurposing
has much lower development costs. 30 New drug development
costs tens of billions of dollars every year, but only results in
about twenty-seven new drug approvals annually. 31 With
repurposing, on the other hand, many of the drugs have already
been put through costly preclinical and early clinical testing.32
For firms, this leads to faster, higher profits, especially if they
are facing expiring patents, high costs, and low productivity.3 3
For non-profit organizations and research institutions, the low
cost of repurposing is an opportunity to treat neglected diseases
or address other unmet medical needs. 34 Third, repurposing has
higher success rates than traditional drug development. 35
Computer-generated screening processes have been used to
identify hundreds of compounds with potential for repurposing.
36
Despite the timing and circumstances under which drug
repurposing has drawn greater interest from pharmaceutical
manufacturers, the National Institutes of Health, non-profit
research centers, and prescribing physicians, the "problem" of
new uses for old drugs has been relatively quickly characterized
25 Id.
26 See Benjamin Roin, Solving the Problem of New Uses by Creating Incentives for
Private Industry to Repurpose Off-Patent Drugs, MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 47), http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11189865
[https://perma.cc/A4VF-C3QA].
27 JP Hughes et al., Principles of Early Drug Discovery, 162 BR. J. PHARMACOLOGY 1239
(2011) ("Developing a new drug from original idea to the launch of a finished product
is a complex process which can take 12-15 years .....
28 Thayer, supra note 24.
29 Guangxu Jin and Stephen T.C. Wong, Toward Better Drug Repositioning: Prioritizing
and Integrating Existing Methods into Efficient Pipelines, 19 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY
637, 637 (2014).
30 Thayer, supra note 24.
31 Roin, supra note 26.




36 See, e.g., Michael J. Keiser et al., Predicting New Molecular Targets for Known Drugs,
462 NATURE 175, 175-81 (2009).
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as one of market failure. 37 As a result of the aforementioned
trends, venture capital firms are unwilling to invest in new drug
development, and new-use discovery offers different, sometimes
complicated incentives. 38 Scholars and industry advocates argue
that a robust market for repurposed drugs is undermined
because generics firms game federal labeling requirements tied
to market exclusivity, and physicians prescribe for off-label off-
patent indications (that is, prescribe a drug for a condition or a
person, like a child, not covered by the FDA's authorization).39
Others argue that firms holding marketing approvals for specific
indications need tailored legal or monetary incentives to use
existing data to support new drug applications.4 0 Public funding
is, as always, inadequate.4 1
Without explicitly stating so, the consensus in the economics,
medical, and even legal literature is that in order to obtain more
drug repurposing of the kind society needs, the incentives for
repurposing drugs should look more like those for de novo drug
development: better patent protection, more market exclusivity,
and tightly regulated conditions for entry by generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers.4 2 This Article challenges that
consensus through two means. First, there has been no
systematic or rational method by which the current level of drug
repurposing may be assessed as being sub-optimal or optimal.
Indeed, the majority of calls for additional incentives come from
those with a financial stake in those incentives materializing.
31 See, e.g., Roin, supra note 26 ("Once [patent] rights expire, pharmaceutical companies
quickly lose their market share to generics. As a result, their incentive to develop new
indications also expires, though many indications may remain untested and often
undiscovered.").
38 Declan Butler, Translational Research: Crossing the Valley of Death, 453 NATURE 840,
841 (2008); John C. Reed, NCATS Could Mitigate Pharma Valley of Death: National
Center for Advancing Translational Science Essential to Capitalize on Basic Research,
31 GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS 6, 6 (2011) ("[Plrivate companies
and venture capitalists are increasingly reluctant to fund the crucial early stages of
preclinical development-the research necessary to 'translate' promising discoveries
made in laboratories into optimized candidate therapeutics ready for testing in
clinical trials.").
39 See, e.g., Roin, supra note 26.
40 Diana W. Shineman et al., Overcoming Obstacles to Repurposing for
Neurodegenerative Disease, 1 ANNALS CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL NEUROLOGY 512, 516
(2014).
41 See Shumei Kato et al., Challenges and Perspectives of Drug Repurposing Strategies in
Early Phase Clinical Trials, 2 ONCOSCIENCE 576, 576 (2015).
42 Scott J. Weir et al., Repurposing Approved and Abandoned Drugs for the Treatment
and Prevention of Cancer Through Public-Private Partnership, 72 CANCER RES. 1056,
1056-57 (2012) ("[Riegulatory approval often requires expensive and complex clinical
trials, but limited returns on investment make it difficult to attract private sector
financing and expertise. New paths to exclusivity and pricing/reimbursement
strategies are needed to promote private sector engagement.").
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Second, drug repurposing occurs through a more complex
process that involves relevant actors-both public and private-
in a more interconnected way. In other words, there is a drug
repurposing ecosystem in place that has generated
extraordinary breakthroughs-by one account, producing one-
third of the major breakthrough drugs of the last half-century. 43
Before deploying additional intellectual property or market
exclusivity protection that may interrupt this system, clinicians,
scholars, and policymakers should understand how that
ecosystem functions.
This Article aims to map the complex system through which
approved drugs enter and circulate within the healthcare system
with the objective of understanding what market, if any, has
failed and, if so, what the mechanisms are that have contributed
toward that failure. Existing narratives take narrow views of
relevant players and their incentives, embedding an incomplete
model of pharmaceutical innovation that is inattentive not only
to public, private, and hybrid organizations promoting drug
repurposing, but also to the regulatory environment in which
that innovation occurs. If the drug repurposing system is not
effectively understood, the legal and monetary incentives now
ascending the list of solutions to the drug repurposing "problem"
may, at best, result in a wasteful giveaway of scarce resources
and, at worst, disrupt the systems of prescription, research,
observation, public, private and regulatory support that
undergird current, reasonably robust, repurposing activity. 44
Against the backdrop of the drug repurposing ecosystem, this
Article examines the trajectory of metformin, a common diabetes
drug; its introduction into, and promotion within, the U.S.
market by Bristol-Myers Squibb; the physician-regulator-
financing networks that steered it toward new disease
treatment; and finally, how proposed "solutions" to the drug
repurposing market may affect those networks in a way that
would undermine, not encourage, new indication research and
development.
Metformin's industrial and market history are an ideal case
study for the current drug repurposing debate. Introduced into
the U.S. market after the most useful patent on it had expired,
metformin enjoyed only the five-year market exclusivity window
43 Aaron Kesselheim et al., The Roles of Academia, Rare Diseases, and Repurposing in
the Development of the Most Transformative Drugs, 34 HEALTH AFF. 286 (2015).
44 See Bernard H. Munos & William W. Chin, A Call for Sharing: Adapting
Pharmaceutical Research to New Realities, 1 SCI. TRANS. MED. 1, 1-3 (2009).
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granted under the Hatch-Waxman Act. After that period ended,
under now-prominent theories, there should have been little, if
any, research into alternative uses because there would be no or
uncertain economic reward for doing so. Yet metformin has
become one of the most actively deployed drugs for off-label uses
and for alternative use research. Clinical trials now under way
investigate its promise for Alzheimer's disease, cancer,
nonalcoholic fatty liver disease, polycystic ovary syndrome (the
most common cause of female infertility), and weight loss,
among others. 45 This Article analyzes how and why metformin
became a prominent focus of academics, regulators, and private
capital without the incentives now advocated in the legal and
medical literature.
Part I of this Article assesses the existing literature
addressing the "problem" of discovering new uses of approved
medicines. Part II explains the process now in place for new
drug development, as well as which aspects of that system
industry advocates endorse for new use research. Part III
identifies and discusses relevant actors, variables, and
influences that shape firms' decisions to seek new indications or
to partner with organizations that do. Part IV analyzes the
history of metformin and the process by which the ecosystem
described in Part II developed. Part V applies the lessons
learned in the industrial and market history of metformin and
applies them to current proposals advocating extension of patent
or other market exclusivities. Part VI provides a brief conclusion.
I. THE DRUG REPURPOSING "PROBLEM"
"Drug repurposing" refers to the research undertaken to
support deployment of both FDA-approved and -unapproved
compounds to disease profiles for which they were not initially
45 See, e.g., Stephen Arnold, A Trial of the Anti-Diabetes Drug Metformin for Alzheimers,
BRIGHTFOCuS.ORG, http://www.brightfocus.org/alzheimers/grant/effect-insulin-
s ensitizer-metformin-alzheim ers-disease-biomarkers [https://perma.cc/]RJX9-EJ7Y];
Kathy Boltz, Clinical Trial Data on Metformin for Cancer are Showing Conflicting
Results, ONCOLOGYNURSEADVISOR. COM (Jan. 2014),
http://www.oncologynurseadvisor.com/web-exclusives/clinical-trial-data-on-metformin-
for-cancer-are-showing-conflicting-results/article/331688 [https://perma.cc/7YZX-
G43E]; Find a Study on PCOS, NATL INST. HEALTH,
https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/PCOS/clinicaltrials/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/24M8-JM7A]; Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, AM. SOC.
REPRODUCTIVE MED., http: www. reproductivefacts. org/faqs/frequently-asked-
questions -about-infertility/q02 -what -causes -infertilitynew-page/
[https://perma.cc/QSH8-QLEV] (noting that PCOS is the most common cause of
female infertility); Treatment of Nonalcoholic Fatty Liver Disease in Children,
CLINICALTRIALS.GOV (Sept. 27, 2012),
https://www.clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/NCT00063635 [https://perma.cc/WN55-QZ23].
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considered. For the latter category of drugs, they are better
understood in the context of repurposing to be "rescued. ' 46 There
are, for example, thousands or tens of thousands of compounds
that drug companies archive after clinical trials or even proof-of-
concept for a specific disease fail to support a new drug
application. 47 This class of compounds in need of rescuing is
different than repurposed drugs, which are compounds that
enjoy FDA approval (for at least one indication), a long market
life, and show promise through clinical observations, university-
based research, or testing through newly available data
aggregation and analysis technologies. 48 In a 2009 Nature article,
Michael Keiser and his collaborators predicted new off-targets
for 878 purchasable FDA-approved small molecule drugs.49 This
Article focuses on these kinds of repurposed drugs and the
incentives for their development.
There is a consensus among scholars studying drug
repurposing that there is a fundamental problem- insufficient
and inadequate research into new uses of approved drugs-
although they do not agree as to the scope, depth, or contours of
that problem. A 2014 report by the Ewing Marion Kauffman
Foundation captures the view of many industry participants and
researchers in asserting that there are not effective ways to give
market exclusivity to new uses. According to the Foundation's
report,
exclusivities provided by patents and the Orphan
Drug Act . . . may be nominally applicable to [new
uses, but] such exclusivities can be undermined by
physician decisions to prescribe the generic version
of the old drug 'off-label' for the new indication.
Lack of exclusivity (typically afforded by the
composition of matter patents for new drugs)
creates challenges for innovator firms, generic
46 Thomas A. Hemphill, The NIH Promotes Drug Repurposing and Drug Rescue, RES.-
TECH. MGMT. (Sept. -Oct. 2012); Univ. of Oxford, Human Trials Suggest 'Rescued'Drug
Could be Safer Treatment for Bipolar Disorder: Initial Human Trial Promising for
'Failed' Drug Ebselen, SCIENCEDAILY (Dec. 8, 2015),
www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/12/151208134125.htm [https://perma.cc/DW7P-
M599].
47 Thayer, supra note 24 ("A few thousand drug candidates are estimated to languish in
pharma company cold storage, and the number only grows as more compounds fail in
development or get dropped for business reasons.").
48 Indeed, as Arti Rai and Grant Rice argue, there isn't really a problem with this class
of drugs since use patents would effectively cover them. Arti Rai & Grant Rice, Use
Patents Can Be Useful: The Case of Rescued Drugs, 6 Sci. TRANSLATIONAL MED. 248
(2014).
49 Keiser et al., supra note 36.
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manufacturers, and investors, making it difficult to
fund drug development activities required for
market approval. 50
MIT's Ben Roin argues that the problem is, in essence, an
"information" problem because pharmaceutical companies do not
know when their drugs are being prescribed for new uses. If
they could, he suggests, they could impose the kinds of
exclusivities described by the Kauffman Foundation.51 Don Frail,
Vice-President of Science at Astra-Zeneca, has argued that firms
should receive twelve years of data exclusivity for approved new
uses.
52
Diana Shineman and her coauthors suggest a royalty
structure for pharmaceutical firms to sponsor Phase III clinical
trials for new use indications for generic drugs, as well as
incentives provided through the government payment
structure. 53 Steven M. Paul and Freda Lewis-Hall state the
"market failure" problem in its most succinct industry-
sympathetic form: "because the pharmaceutical industry will be
the main source of repurposed drugs, any impediments to
Pharma's active (and enthusiastic) participation must be
anticipated and removed."54 Arti Rai suggests that the problem
is essentially a lack of public support for new use research,
especially costly Phase II and Phase III clinical trials.55
Legislative proposals circulating in Congress give a
designated data exclusivity period in exchange for patent rights
to encourage pharmaceutical firms to undertake research
related to repurposing.56 Drafts of the 21st Century Cures Act
50 A New Market Access Path for Repurposed Drugs, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND.
(May 2014),
http://www.kauffman.org/-/media/kauffman org/research%20reports%20and%20cover
s/2014/05/new market access path for repurposed drugs.pdf
[https://perma.ce/69W9-8CX5].
51 Roin, supra note 26.
52 Beachy et al., Drug Repurposing and Repositioning: Workshop Summary, NATL
ACADEMIES PRESS 10 (2014),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK202175/pdf/TOC.pdf [https://perma.ce/3RP4-
NKZ4].
53 Diana W. Shineman et. al., Overcoming Obstacles to Repurposing for
Neurodegenerative Disease, 1 ANNALS CLINICAL & TRANSLATIONAL NEUROLOGY 512, 516
(2014).
54 Steven M. Paul & Freda Lewis-Hall, Drugs in Search of Diseases, 5 SC. TRANSL. MED.
186, 186 (2013).
55 Arti Rai, Use Patents, Carve-Outs, and Incentives A New Battle in the Drug-Patent
Wars, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 491, 492 (2012).
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included fifteen-year exclusivity for drugs that met "unmet
medical needs" and two-year exclusivity for enhancements to
approved drugs like "greater patient adherence" and limitation
of side effects. 57 Under the Hatch-Bennett Dormant Therapies
Act,
the innovator [would] waive any patents that
extend beyond the 15-year marketing exclusivity,
in exchange for extending patents that expire
within 15 years .... According to the bill, [a drug]
is dormant if 'The medicine is being investigated or
is intended to be investigated for an indication to
address one or more unmet medical needs ... ,"'58
These provisions represent the broad agreement that
repurposing incentives should start to look more like incentives
in place for de novo drug development.
To a lesser extent, scholars describe drug repurposing as an
institutional-design problem rather than an incentive-based one.
For example, some scholars have argued that collaborative
efforts between manufacturers, academic institutions, and small
biotechnology firms are hampered by the high costs of
negotiating agreements over technology transfer and intellectual
property rights. The organization Cures Within Reach, for
example, avoids support of research for unapproved compounds
because legal, intellectual, and publication barriers make doing
so cost prohibitive. 59
II. DRUG DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES, INCENTIVES, AND
PLAYERS
While it remains largely unstated in the aforementioned
sources, it may be surmised that scholars and legislators broadly
suggest that repurposing incentives should look more like the
system in place for new drug development. Certainly, when
pharmaceutical firms consider repurposing candidates, the same
market perspectives apply. "The class [of repurposing candidates]
offering the most novelty is off-target pharmacology-finding a
51 Alexander Gaffney, 10 Proposals Worth Paying Attention to in the 21st Century Cures
Act, REG. AFF. PROFESSIONALS Socy (Jan. 30, 2015), http://raps.org/Regulatory-
Focus/News/2015/01/30/21208/ 10-Proposals-Worth-Paying-Attention-to-in-the-21st-
Century- Cures -Act/ [https://perma.cc/6WBE-5R9V].
58 Graham, supra note 56.
59 Deborah Collyer, How To Solve Diseases with Existing Drugs, ONE HEALTH OF A LIFE
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://collyar.wordpress.com/2016/04/28/how-to-solve-diseases-with-
existing-drugs [https://perma.cc/D52W-S4HG]; Thayer, supra note 24.
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new target in a new disease with an old drug.' ' 0 A somewhat
less novel class is on-target repurposing, hitting a known target
in a new disease.61 Under both systems, good drug prospects
must be identified and acquired, and new uses still must meet
all of the FDA's regulatory requirements to be approved. 62
Some detail as to what those regulatory requirements entail
will shed light on why drug repurposing is an appealing
alternative to developing new drugs from scratch. The costs
involved in clinical development have increased substantially in
recent decades.63 The average cost to develop one new drug
nearly doubled from 2000 to 2005 alone.6 4 A brief overview of the
drug development process will help explain why these costs are
high and continue to escalate.
The first phase with which new drug development normally
begins is identifying a candidate target for drug action followed
by preclinical chemical synthesis to identify a family of
molecules as candidate new chemical entities (NCEs). 65
Researchers-increasingly at universities and small startups-
determine the candidate NCE's basic properties, including
safety in cells and animals, and its pharmacodynamics and
pharmacokinetic characteristics. These tests predict the NCE's
effect in humans so that a lead candidate and a safe dose for
human trials may be identified. "An additional component of the
precinical research phase is to test the drug both in vitro and on
relevant animal species for pharmacological activity and
toxicity."66
When in vitro and animal studies have been completed, the
sponsor firm may file an Investigational New Drug (IND)
application with the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research ("CDER")-the unit responsible for regulating new
chemical entities (i.e., a drug that contains no active moiety that
has been approved by the FDA in any other application
submitted under section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act) at which point it becomes "a new drug subject to
60 Thayer, supra note 24, at 5.
61 See Michael Pollastri & Robert Campbell, Target Repurposing for Neglected Diseases,
3 FUTURE MED CHEMISTRY 1307 (2011).
62 Thayer, supra note 24.
63 Jesse Goodman, Addressing Emerging Challenges in the Pharmaceutical Product
Development Ecosystem, in FOOD AND DRUG REGULATION IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZED
MARKETS 4-5 (Sam Halabi ed., 2015).
64 Id.
65 Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (2014),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandA
pproved/ApprovalApplications/InvestigationalNewDrugINDApplication/default.htm
[https://perma.cc/2BBW-P3QX] [hereinafter IND Application].
6 Goodman, supra note 63.
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specific requirements of the drug regulatory system."6 7 The FDA
requires the IND application to present data and analysis that
pertain to three general issues: pharmacology and toxicology
studies, the properties of and manufacturing process for the
drug, and a proposed protocol for human trials which includes
safeguards to ensure that human test subjects are not exposed
to any unnecessary risks.68 Once an IND is authorized, the
sponsor typically embarks on a three-phase clinical development
process intended to lead to approval.
Phase I trials are designed to assess the safety,
immunogenicity and dose-response of the drug in, typically,
twenty to one-hundred healthy volunteers.6 9 Phase II studies
involve several hundred healthy volunteers. 70 They are designed
to identify the most appropriate dose or doses for further studies,
as well as to identify safety issues that may not have been
apparent in the smaller number of subjects included in Phase I.
A control group is often included and administered a placebo
while the test group receives the drug. Phase III trials enroll up
to thousands or tens of thousands of human subjects in order to
detect sometimes rare adverse events. 71 Phase III studies are
typically referred to as "pivotal" and are designed to establish
the efficacy and safety of the product, and support its approval,
for the intended indication(s) and in the intended
population(s). 72 They are typically randomized and well-
controlled studies comparing the drug against a placebo or
standard of care and measuring effects on meaningful clinical
endpoints.
At the conclusion of clinical testing, if studies support a
favorable benefit-to-risk profile, the drug manufacturer submits
a New Drug Application (NDA). The NDA is extensive and costly
to generate. It includes comprehensive information on chemistry,
manufacturing processes and specifications, clinical data
supporting each dosage and dosing form/route the manufacturer
intends to use, proposed packaging and labeling, and the results
of all relevant preclinical (e.g., laboratory and animal studies of
drug effects, including toxicology) and clinical testing. The NDA
also typically provides plans both for safety surveillance, which
may be needed to address any safety signals or questions
identified during development, as well as any planned Phase IV
68 IND Application, supra note 65.
68 21 CFR § 312.23(a)(8) (2017).
69 See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2017).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Goodman, supra note 63.
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studies intended to be performed post-marketing. The complete
application is reviewed by CDER by a multidisciplinary team
that typically includes biologists, physicians, statisticians and
epidemiologists, chemists, manufacturing experts,
pharmacologists, and other scientists. Finally, the FDA conducts
an inspection of the manufacturer's facilities. Upon final
approval, the manufacturer brings the drug to market. However,
the manufacturer must continue to submit safety and
manufacturing updates to the FDA to ensure that the product
performs as expected, and must also complete and submit the
results of any Phase IV studies.
A. The Conventional Pharmaceutical Model: Small
Molecules, Specific Targets, Widespread Disease
Just as with de novo drug development, large pharmaceutical
firms are understandably sensitive to the potential returns on
research and development investments.7 3 New approved drugs
are profitable if firms can charge high prices for new drugs,
develop drugs for widespread diseases (or risk factors for
disease), or both. 74 Pharmaceutical research and development
priorities over the course of the last three decades have
therefore focused on conditions like high cholesterol, asthmatic
airway passages, depression, and ulcerous digestive systems.75
Similarly, large pharmaceutical firms have prioritized research
into single molecules that may be tailored to target cellular
flaws causing or associated with specific diseases, aiming to
patch or destroy the flaw without harming healthy cells, again,
in large populations. 76 As a result, considerable research and
development resources are committed to screening vast numbers
of compounds to find one that might target one cellular protein,
genetic flaw, or gene per se.
Over the course of the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, this model
generated extraordinary returns for pharmaceutical companies
13 Steven M. Paul et al., How to Improve R&D Productivity: The Pharmaceutical
Industry's Grand Challenge, 9 NAT'L REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 203, 203 (2010).
14 Kevin Outterson et al., Repairing the Broken Market for Antibiotic Innovation, 34
HEALTH AFF. 277, 278 (2015).
15 Daniel J. DeNoon, The 10 Most Prescribed Drugs, WEBMD NEWS ARCHIVE (Apr. 20,
2011), http://www.webmd.com/news/20110420/the- 10-most-prescribed-drugs
[https://perma.cc/F5GZ-JWP9].
16 Antti Jekunen, Decision-making in Product Portfolios of Pharmaceutical Research and
Development Managing Streams of Innovation in Highly Regulated Markets, 8 DRUG
DESIGN, DEV. & THERAPY 2009, 2010 (2014) ("A drug development company typically
has many projects, and a leading drug molecule and several other molecules that form
a pipeline.").
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and their investors. At its peak in 2006, Pfizer's Lipitor sales
topped $13 billion annually; Bristol-Myers Squibb's anti-
depressant Abilify reached over $7 billion in 2011, and
AstraZeneca's Seroquel brought in over $6 billion in revenues
the same year. 77 Yet the model, by its nature, is limited, and
current trends suggest that the "low-hanging fruit" of small
molecule-specific target-widespread disease has been picked. 78
Jie Jack Li summarized the situation in his 2013 work,
Blockbuster Drugs: the Rise and Decline of the Pharmaceutical
Industry:
The last 10 years have seen dramatic changes in
the pharmaceutical industry. Many patents,
especially for blockbuster drugs, have expired. Yet
new blockbuster drugs are few and far between,
certainly not enough to fill the gap of lost revenues
due to patent expirations. The industry has
panicked, making many knee-jerk decisions with
dubious consequences. One is merger mania . . .
Another trend we are seeing is outsourcing . . . It
seems that the golden age for small-molecule block
buster drugs is behind us. However, blockbuster
drugs for biologics are on the rise.79
Li is correct that reducing clinical research costs through
outsourcing, mergers and divestitures, and investment in
biologics is part of the shifting industry landscape. "Biologics"
differ from small molecule drugs in that they are manufactured
in a living system such as a microorganism, or plant or animal
cells. They are generally complex molecules or combinations of
molecules. In 2013, seven of the top eight bestselling drugs were
biologics-e.g., AbbVie's Humira, Pfizer's Enbrel, and Roche's
Avastin-generating a combined $58 bilhon.80 There are several
77 Simon King, The Best Selling Drugs of All Time; Humira Joins The Elite, FORBES (Jan.
28, 2013 9:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/simonking/2013/01/28/the-best-selling-
drugs-of-all-time-humira-joins-the-elite [https://perma.cc/5QPG-BLJN].
78 Cockburn, supra note 11, at 14 ("Many commentators have suggested that the
pharmaceutical industry is facing sharply diminishing marginal returns to R&D.
Drews (1998), for example, characterizes drug development during the 1970s and '80s
as a matter of making minor chemical improvements to existing compounds directed
at a static set of about 500 well-proven physiological 'targets' an activity that surely
runs quickly into diminishing returns.").
79 Jie Jack Li, BLOCKBUSTER DRUGS: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY 171-72 (2013).
80 Rob Wright, Can Big Pharma Survive in a Big Biotech World?, LIFESCIENCELEADER
BLOG (May 15, 2014), http://www.lifescienceleader.com/doc/can-big-pharma-survive-in-
a-big-biotech-world-0001 [https://perma.cc/7LVE-EETZ].
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advantages to investing in biologics: U.S. law gives approved
biologics a twelve-year market exclusivity period (new small
molecules receive only five-practically six to seven given the
delays that accompany generics applications) and, because they
are more fundamentally tied to the means by which they are
manufactured, they are more difficult for generics firms to
cheaply imitate.8 1
But those are not the only transitions underway in major
pharmaceutical firms. Since 1997, when the FDA eased rules on
direct-to-consumer advertising, large pharmaceutical firms have
invested heavily in advertising and marketing, spending much
more-in some cases twice as much-on detailing, sampling,
educational programming, promotional mailings, web
advertisements, and very large in-house sales forces as they
spend on research and development. 82 Pharmaceutical firms
continue to spend on marketing branded drugs when a lower-
cost generic has entered the market.8 3
Pharmaceutical firms also turned to drug rescuing and
repurposing 8 4 "There is a greater emphasis [on repurposing]
now as companies try to squeeze more revenue out of their
existing assets." 5 While there are other factors that explain the
ascent of drug repurposing-like the application of sophisticated
"big data" analytics to large sources of small molecule
information like the FDA's "Approved Drug Products With
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations," or "Orange Book"-drug
repurposing is in large measure part of a broad industry
response to its changing business climate.
81 W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics Competition
and Innovation, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1024, 1028 (2015).
82 Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC (Nov. 6,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223 [https://perma.cc/7ZWF-4V7L];
Bulletin of the World Health Organization, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Under
Fire, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 2009), http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/8/09-
040809/en [https://perma.cc/35LV-6X8G]; Persuading the Prescribers: Pharmaceutical
Industry Marketing and its Influence on Physicians and Patients, PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-
sheets/2013/11/11/persuading-the-prescribers-pharmaceutical-industry-marketing-
and-its-influence-on-physicians-and-patients [https://perma.cc/6G45-TD7M].
83 Fernando Antonanzas et al., Innovation, Loyalty and Generic Competition in
Pharmaceutical Markets, 2 SERIES 75, 78 (2011).
84 Thayer, supra note 24 ("Revisiting shelved compounds is an undertaking without
much downside and one that can help companies feeling the pressures of expiring
patents, high costs, and low productivity. Some firms have cut back on early R&D and
have made repurposing a part of their core business.").
85 Id. (citing Richard K. Harrison, Scientific Director at Thomson Reuters).
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B. Origins and Players in Pharmaceutical Innovation
Even if repurposing has become a larger share of large
pharmaceutical firm activity, the core of the business remains
drug development and approval. The development of new drug
compounds (or application of existing drugs to new indications)
is itself the result of a complex matrix of financial support,
organizational structure, and access to knowledge that
influences how and why major pharmaceutical firms undertake
drug research and development in-house, collaborate with public
or private researchers outside the firm, support drug research
and development in universities, or acquire smaller, nimbler
firms for their compounds and/or researchers. 86 There is no
effective method by which to precisely identify where in this
matrix drug discovery and development occurs (and competitive
markets mean it will always change), but analysis of certain
features of these research bodies helps clarify the institutional
design questions most relevant to the drug repurposing debate.
A substantial portion of a large pharmaceutical company's
research and development budget, seventy-five percent or more,
is devoted to Phase II, Phase III, and post-approval studies
required to prove the efficacy, safety, and value to regulators,
payers, physicians, and patients. 87 The disproportionate
allocation of resources to development, approval and, essentially,
marketing, still leaves substantial support for new drug or new
use research-but even so, structural features of in-house
research limit the innovative (or repurposing) potential of in-
house efforts. Researchers within large pharmaceutical firms
will frequently have a portfolio of diseases upon which they work,
marginalizing possible new uses for diseases with which they
are less familiar, or which are not firm priorities.8 8 A researcher
working on a promising molecule to treat heart failure, for
86 Ronald Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational
Structure and Financial Contracting, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 885 (2009).
87 John LaMattina, Should Pharma Companies Give Up Discovery Research?,
FORBES.COM (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2013/9/10/should-pharma-companies-give-
up-discovery-research [https://perma.cc/E8QB-XDZQ]; see also Canada's Research-
Based Pharmaceutical Companies (Rx&D) 2015 Pre-Budget Submission House of
Commons Standing Committee on Finance, PARLIAMENT CAN. (Aug. 6, 2014),
http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/412/FINA/WebDoc/WD6615327/412 F
INA PBC2014 Briefs/CanadasResearchBasedPharmaceuticalCompaniesRxD-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/53WP-9U6W] ("In 2013, Rx&D members invested more than $1
billion in R&D-with 75% of this activity devoted to clinical trials-and
approximately $322 million toward patient and community contributions.").
88 Jekunen, supra note 76, at 2011 ("In general these [drug development teams] are
aligned by disease area, with each disease area-responsible direct empowered to make
go/no-go decisions.").
Drug Repurposing Ecosystem
example, will not typically be thinking of its potential
applicability for cancer.
Relatedly, internal cognitive biases like "sunk costs" and
over-optimism also limit repurposing activity. 89 Once a
researcher or a research team has made progress toward the
applicability of a candidate to a specific disease target, there is a
tendency to hesitate to end the project when results become less
promising. Data that may be ambiguous or even negative is read
as supporting initial hypotheses with respect to the candidate
molecule, and more positive data is moved up the firm
hierarchy. 90 Both of these biases act to limit the inherent
capacity of pharmaceutical firms to repurpose as part of the
development process.
Inherent biases play an important role, but even as a
consciously adopted strategy, repurposing exposes firms to
avoidable risks related to the principal market for an approved
drug. Research into new uses may expose adverse events that
might undermine the profitability of the drug for the use that
initially earned FDA approval. 91 This disincentive to
repurpose-undermining the market potential of a currently
profitable drug or exposing the manufacturer to large tort
liability-is rarely mentioned in the current debate and may
provide a significant explanation for why less repurposing
activity is under way.
Pharmaceutical firms therefore participate in a wide range of
research support activities that comprise varying portions of
their new drug pipeline. The degree of investment in academic
research or drugs nearing early clinical studies also varies
according to the broader risk-analysis and disease
specializations of firms. Investments in early stage, academic
research are inherently speculative with a low probability of
success. 92 Alternatively, pharmaceutical firms may invest in
research programs showing indications of working in patients.93
Doing so increases the chances that competitors will also bid for
89 Randolph Case, Managing Risk in Pharmaceutical R&D, 53 RES-TECH. MGMT. 24, 24
(2015); Richard W. Peck et al., Why Is It Hard to Terminate Failing Projects In
Pharmaceutical R&D?, 14 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 663, 663-664 (2015).
90 Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV.
101, 125 (1997).
91 Thayer, supra note 24.
92 See Jose-Maria Fernandez, Roger M Stein & Andrew W. Lo, Commercializing
Biomedical Research Through Securitization Techniques, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY
964 (2012).
93 LaMattina, supra note 87.
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promising compounds. 94 Investments made later in the
development process are subject to higher upfront payments and
royalties that would not be associated had compounds been
developed internally. 95
The distribution of pharmaceutical company investments is
borne out by the data on new approvals. A study of 252 new
drugs approved by the FDA between 1998 and 2007 found that
drugs initially discovered in biotechnology companies or
universities accounted for approximately half of the drugs that
responded to unmet medical needs and represented innovative
rather than me-too approvals. 96 A more recent study by HBM
Partners, a healthcare investment firm, concluded that 64% of
drugs approved since 2006 have originated in small
biotechnology companies .9
Drug repurposing activity mirrors this general distribution of
investment and risk. Repurposing has occurred within
diversifying forms of private, public, and hybrid research
initiatives as large pharmaceutical manufacturers seek
collaborative partnerships to exploit new uses for old drugs.
Indeed, this ascendant method of filling drug pipelines has even
facilitated agreements between large competitors. In 2015,
AstraZeneca and Sanofi agreed to give each other "free access to
210,000 usually closely guarded compounds ... as a 'cheap and
quick way' of diversifying" the companies' drug portfolios. 98
C. The Nexus Between Drug Approval and Market
Exclusivity
Whether through in-house development, partnership, or
acquisition, pharmaceutical firms currently recoup their
research, development, acquisition, and marketing costs through
the prices they are able to charge based on the ability to exclude
others and, to some extent, convince buyers to purchase brand
name drugs even when generic forms are available. 99 There are
two principal forms of market exclusivity that firms obtain when
the FDA grants approval of a new drug application or a
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Robert Kneller, The Importance of New Companies for Drug Discovery: Origins of a
Decade of New Drugs, 9 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 867 (2010).
91 Jennifer Alsever, Big Pharma Innovation in Small Places, FORTUNE (May 13, 2016)
http://fortune.com/2016/05/13/big-pharma-biotech-startups [https://perma.cc/ED6K-
3VQ7].
98 Denise Roland, Drug Companies Seek Edge by Sharing Secrets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20,
2015.
99 See Yaniv Heled, Patents v. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological Pharmaceuticals Do
We Really Need Both, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 419 (2012).
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supplemental100 new drug application requesting approval of an
existing approved drug for a new indication. 101
1. Patents
First, firms gain the normal market exclusivity that applies
for the life of a patent that runs from the time the patent was
filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, currently
between ten and twelve years. 102 In the pharmaceutical context,
two typical kinds of patents protect innovations: composition-of-
matter patents and use patents. 103 Composition-of-matter
patents protect
all compositions of two or more substances ... and
all composite articles, whether they be the results
of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or
whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids. 104
These are the most valuable kinds of pharmaceutical patents
since they allow the patent holder to exclude all others who wish
to use the basic structure of the molecule they have developed,
regardless of purpose.
Use patents, or method-of-use patents, cover the use of the
molecule to treat a specific disease or diseases. The discovery of
a new indication for an old drug can form the basis for a method-
of-use patent if the discovery is novel, unexpected, and
potentially beneficial. The new-use claims may apply to both
patent-protected and patent-expired drugs if the new use has
not been previously disclosed or covered in the original patents
pertaining to the drug. For use patents, the brand manufacturer
100 Usage of the term "supplemental" may be misleading; it is commonly used to refer to
the approval pathway under 505(b)(2) described below, but there are also continuing
obligations to "supplement" NDAs for changes in labeling, manufacturing, and so on.
101 See Henry G. Grabowski et al., The Roles of Patents and Research and Development
Incentives in Biopharmaceutical Innovation, 34 HEALTH AFF. 302 (2015).
102 See Kate S. Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to Protect New Drugs, 29 NAT.
BIOTECHNOLOGY 876 (2011); Alfred Engelburg, How Government Policy Promotes High
Drug Prices, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 29, 2015) ("According to the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, it takes at least 10 years to develop a new drug. It is no
surprise that the typical monopoly period on an existing drug is also 10-12 years.");
see also Frank R. Lichtenberg, Time Release: The Effect of Patent Expiration on U.S.
Drug Prices, Marketing, and Utilization by the Public, CTR. FOR MED. PROGRESS
MANHATTAN INST. (Oct. 20, 2009), https://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/time-
release-effect -patent- expiration -us -drug-prices -marketing-andutiization -public-
5938.html [http://perma.cc/G856-9YSR].
103 Rai & Rice, supra note 48.
104 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (quoting Shell Development Co. v.
Watson, 149 F. Supp 279, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (citation omitted)).
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must provide a description of the methods, which is referred to
as the "use code narrative" when included in the FDA Orange
Book. For example, a use patent may read: "A method for
treating non-insulin dependent diabetes mellitus (NIDDM)
comprising administering to a patient in need of such treatment
repaglinide in combination with metformin." 105 Repurposed
drugs typically target a new patient population or a new
indication; or include a new dosage form, dosing regimen, or
route of administration. In short, any time the label instructs
the patient or physician to do something, that method is
potentially patentable. 106
Use patents are weaker and therefore more costly to
enforce. 107 They are weaker not only because of basic
vulnerabilities in patentability criteria-for example, non-
obviousness-but also because generics firms may seek FDA
approval only for expired patent uses, even though they (and
prescribers) know that, once the generic is on the market, it will
be prescribed for more than just that indication. Indeed, one
study found that only 12 of 170 molecules approved by FDA
between 1996 and 2004 relied exclusively on use patents. 108
There is a general consensus that method-of-use patents
"generally do not provide sufficient exclusivity protection once
the basic compound patent expires." 109
This is consistent with the overall scheme of Congress in the
Hatch-Waxman Act to balance the rights of innovators against
the right of people to affordable medications. Courts interpreting
this so-called "skinny labeling" tactic of generics firms have
determined that holding generics firms accountable for
infringement actually committed by prescribers would allow a
pioneer manufacturer to extend its monopoly "by regularly filing
a new patent application claiming a narrow method of use not
covered by its [New Drug Application]."'11 °
Otherwise, use patents would serve as the principal
mechanism by which drug repurposing could provide extensive
and valuable monopolies to pharmaceutical manufacturers.
105 Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Lab., Ltd., 719 F. 3d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
106 Ned Israelsen, New Patents for Old Drugs: Label-Based Strategies in the United States,
PHARMA Focus ASIA, http://www.pharmafocusasia.com/strategy/new-patents-old-drugs
[http://perma.ce/5ZDB-6JJQ].
107 Rai, supra note 55.
108 See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug
Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 613, 625 (2011).
109 Paul & Lewis-Hall, supra note 54, at 187.
110 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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2. Statutory and Regulatory Market Exclusivity
Second, even where a drug is not patentable or a patent has
expired, federal law allows firms to exclude others (typically
generics firms) from using the data that supports their new drug
applications: five years for new pharmaceutical chemical entities,
seven years for drugs designated to treat "orphan" diseases,
three years for new indications for pharmaceutical drugs, and
twelve years for biologic products.111 These exclusivities are, in
turn, intertwined with statutory and regulatory approval
pathways. 112
In the United States, there are three common pathways
available by which to obtain approval for drug products: FDCA
Act sections 505(b)(1), 505(b)(2), and 505(j). 113 The section
505(b)(1) ("new drug application") pathway applies to novel
chemical entities and requires significant nonclinical and
clinical pharmacology and toxicology test data support. 114 The
section 505(j) ("abbreviated new drug application") pathway
applies to generic drugs and requires clinical bioequivalence
studies to show that two drug products are equivalent. 115
The section 505(b)(2) ("supplemental new drug application"
or "sNDA") pathway focuses on a new formulation or new use of
an already approved drug product. 116 In this pathway, previous
data submissions supporting safety and efficacy of known drugs
may be used so that only studies supporting the safety and/or
efficacy of the new indication are necessary. 117 Using the section
505(b)(2) pathway, the applicant may be able to use prior
pharmacology and toxicology studies related to the drug. The
application may reference published studies available in the
academic literature, approved product labels, or product
monographs. 118 A similar pathway also exists for the filing of
111 Emily Michiko Morris, The Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 253, 256-57
(2012); see CDER Small Bus. & Indus. Assistance, Patents and Exclusivity,
FDA/CDER SBIA Chronicles (May 19, 2015),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassis
tance/ucm447307.pdf [http://perma.cc/8TWN-9Y82].
112 See Diana W. Shineman et al., Overcoming Obstacles to Repurposing for
Neurodegenerative Disease, 1 ANNALS CLINICAL TRANSLATIONAL NEUROLOGY 512, 513
(2014).
113 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
114 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (2017).
115 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
116 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2) (2012).
117 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2012).
118 Mahadeo A. Sukhai et al., New Sources of Drugs for Hematologic Malignancies, 117
BLOOD 6747, 6752 (2011) ("In this pathway, the previous findings of safety and
efficacy of known drugs can be leveraged so that only studies necessary to support the
safety and/or efficacy of the new indication need to be conducted. Therefore, using the
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investigational new drug applications for clinical trials of known
drugs for new indications. As such, even patent-protected drugs
may be evaluated for new indications without submitting the
chemistry and manufacturing files in the investigational new
drug or even obtaining the approval of the original sponsors, if
the drug product is used in compliance with the approved
product label. In addition to a new use claim, an applicant may
also include development of a new formulation in order to obtain
market exclusivity.
When a brand manufacturer obtains FDA approval for a new
drug product or method of treatment, it submits to the FDA a
list of relevant patents, both composition-of-matter and method-
of-use, and their expiration dates. For method-of-use patents,
the brand manufacturer also provides the aforementioned use
code narratives. The FDA does not investigate or verify the
identified patents or uses, but publishes the information in the
Orange Book. 119 Patent considerations are relevant for drug
approval under the section 505(b)(2) pathway, as a 505(b)(2)
approval may be delayed because of patent or exclusivity
protection.
Separately, firms may achieve market exclusivity for
repurposed drugs by showing their efficacy in treating rare
diseases. The Orphan Drug Act encourages pharmaceutical
firms to develop compounds for the treatment of rare diseases,
where "orphan" is defined as a prevalence of less than two
hundred thousand people. 120 The Orphan Drug Act offers
economic and other incentives to develop therapies for rare
disease. For example, when reviewing orphan drug applications,
the FDA accepts smaller cohort sizes for registration trials and
waives certain fees associated with the development and
approval of orphan drugs. 121 Orphan drug candidates also
attract significant grants and qualify for tax credits. Approval of
505(b)(2) mechanism, the sponsor may be able to capitalize on the prior pharmacology
and toxicology studies related to the drug rather than repeating these studies.").
119 See Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda. gov/Drugs/InformationOnDrugs/ucm 129662.htm
[https://perma.cc/XHJ2-R2XT]; Courtenay C. Brinckerhoff, U.S. Courts Look at
Method of Use Patents in Generic Drug/ANDA Litigation, KLUWER PATENT BLOG (May
21, 2012), http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2012/05/21/u-s-courts-look-at-method-of-use-
patents-in-generic-druganda-litigation [http://perma.cc/BX9B-89JC].
120 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2008); Caroline Asbury, The Orphan Drug Act: The First 7
Years, 265 JAMA 893, 896 (1991).
121 Aaron Kesselheim, Innovation and the Orphan Drug Act, 1983-2009: Regulatory and
Clinical Characteristics of Approved Orphan Drugs, in RARE DISEASES AND ORPHAN
PRODUCTS: ACCELERATING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 26 (MJ Field & TF Boat eds.,
2010).
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orphan drugs provides market exclusivity for seven years. 122
Before the introduction of the Orphan Drug Act in the United
States in 1983, only 38 treatments were approved by the FDA
for rare conditions. Since passage of the law, more than 350 new
treatments have been approved. 123 In 2015, Congress introduced
the "Orphan Product Extensions Now Accelerating Cures &
Treatments Act," or OPEN Act, which would have made
available an additional six months of market exclusivity for
repurposed treatments if the sponsor company established that
the therapy was designated to treat a rare disease and obtained
a rare disease indication from the FDA on the drug label. 124
The Orphan Drug Act has also encouraged some firms to
intentionally position drugs for orphan indications and then rely
on off-label prescribing for non-orphan indications to
supplement revenues. It has also allowed some firms to obtain
orphan designation for known drugs already widely prescribed
but unapproved for an orphan designation. 125 The market
exclusivity granted for orphan indications creates the same
incentives as other forms of intellectual property and data
protection. That is, when market exclusivities are inexpensive to
enforce, firms do so. For example, URL Pharma received orphan
drug designation for colchicine for the treatment of familial
Mediterranean fever and a label indication for the treatment of
gout. 126 Although colchicine had been used for many years for
the treatment of these conditions, randomized Phase III data
were not available to support the indication. 127 In exchange for
producing the data demonstrating clinical efficacy, the FDA
granted URL Pharma three years of market exclusivity for the
treatment of gout and seven years of market exclusivity for the
treatment of familial Mediterranean fever. The price of
colchicine rose fifty-fold after these approvals and URL's legal
122 Bill Walsh, The Tier IV Phenomenon Shifting the High Cost of Drugs to Consumers,
AARP (March 9, 2009), http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/tierfour.pdf
[https://perma.ce/JY6G-WFYX].
123 Sinead Murphy et al., Unintended Effects of Orphan Product Designation for Rare
Neurological Diseases, 72 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 481, 481 (2012).
124 Orphan Product Extensions Now Accelerating Cures and Treatments Act of 2015, H.R.
971, 114th Cong. (2015).
125 Shannon Gibson & Barbara von Tigerstrom, Orphan Drug Incentives in the
Pharmacogenomic Context: Policy Responses in the US and Canada, 2 J. L. &
BIOSCIENCES 263, 281 (2015).
126 Aaron Kesselheim & Daniel Solomon, Incentives for Development The Curious Case
of Colchicine, 362 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2045, 2046 (2010). According to the authors,
colchicine was grandfathered in because it existed before the FDCA.
127 Id. at 2045.
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efforts against other manufacturers to enforce its exclusivity
rights. 128
Indeed, in a letter inviting U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) investigation of the law, Senators Orrin Hatch,
Chuck Grassley, and Tom Cotton wrote that "some
pharmaceutical manufacturers might be taking advantage of the
multiple designation allowance in the orphan drug approval
process." 129 That letter in turn was motivated in some measure
by a Kaiser Health News investigation finding that
[m]ore than 70 [orphan-disease designated drugs] were
drugs first approved by the Food and Drug
Administration for mass market use. These medicines,
some with familiar brand names, were later approved
as orphans. In each case, their manufacturers received
millions of dollars in government incentives plus seven
years of exclusive rights to treat that rare disease, or a
monopoly. 130
In 2012, the Generating Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN)
provisions were signed into the law as part of the Food and Drug
Administration Safety and Innovation Act. 131 GAIN grants an
additional five years of exclusivity for a new antibiotic
designated as a "qualified infectious disease product," defined as
"an antibacterial or antifungal drug for human use intended to
treat serious or life-threatening infections." The five years of
market protection are added to any existing exclusivity,
including that which may be applicable under Hatch-Waxman,
orphan drug, or pediatric exclusivity (six months, as discussed
infra).
III. THE DRUG REPURPOSING ECOSYSTEM
As the above discussion reveals, the process of developing
new drugs is itself extraordinarily complex; relies upon a set of
incentives with essentially unknown influence; and, more
recently, is deeply affected by the changing environment for
128 Id. at 2046.
129 Letter from Sen. Orrin Hatch et al. to Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller Gen., U.S. Gov't
Accountability Office (Mar. 3, 2017),
https:Hkaiserhealthnews.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/gao-request-oda-signed1-002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8R8P-E27V].
130 Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugs For Rare Diseases Have Become
Uncommonly Rich Monopolies, MORNING ED. (Jan. 17, 2017, 4:59 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/01/17 /509506836/drugs-for-rare-
diseases-have-become-uncommonly-rich-monopolies [https://perma.cc/2YVX-PK5M].
131 GAIN Act, Pub. L. 112-144 (2012).
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large pharmaceutical innovator firms. Indeed, the costs of
developing a single new drug is among the most controversial
and heated topic in the public health literature, with abundant,
disputed evidence all around. 132
Repurposing drugs involves an even greater number of
players, with more diverse incentives, working in far more
ambiguous zones of formal regulation. Market exclusivity
incentives-whether through the patent system or idiosyncratic
regulatory regimes-cannot, at least on currently available
evidence, be assumed to work in the same way as de novo drug
development incentives. Indeed, there has been no study to date
asserting that the amount of repurposing activity is suboptimal.
The studies that do exist suggest that currently approved drugs
may show promise in other disease areas, not that they will be
safer or more efficacious. Given these uncertainties, it is not
clear that deploying the kinds of incentives used for de novo
drug development will generate the kinds of repurposing activity
society needs and, indeed, doing so may substantially interrupt
the processes that now bring many repurposed drugs to market.
In contrast to de novo drug development, the process by
which new indications for approved drugs are discovered
involves a larger set of actors who are, in turn, more integrated
into the healthcare system and function under a different set of
incentives less formalized than the market exclusivity
mechanisms identified above. To date, new indication discovery
has been largely driven by serendipitous observations made by
academic researchers, clinicians, and pharmaceutical firm
researchers. 133 Pharmaceutical firms have encouraged this
disaggregated new indication system through technically illegal
but widespread "off-label marketing' and, relatedly, legal,
practices like disseminating third-party medical literature about
alternative indications for approved drugs. 134
A. Serendipity and Clinical Observations
To some extent, drug repurposing is embedded in the
research and treatment process itself. Alexander Fleming was
engaged in research on influenza when one of his staphylococcus
132 Jerry Avorn, The $2. 6 Billion Pill Methodologic and Policy Considerations, 372 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1877, 1877 (2015).
133 Divya Sardana et al., Drug Repositioning for Orphan Diseases, 12 BRIEF BIOINFORM.
346, 347 (2011).
134 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(a), 352(a), 352(f) (2012); Marc J. Scheineson & Guillermo Cuevas,
United States v. Caronia: The Increasing Strength of Commercial Free Speech and
Potential New Emphasis on Classifying Off-Label Promotion as "False and
Misleading", 68 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 201, 206 (2013).
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culture plates became contaminated and developed a mold that
created a bacteria-free circle. 135 Fleming recognized the possible
significance of the bacteria-free circle, and by isolating the mold
in pure culture he found that it produced a substance that has a
powerful destructive effect on many of the common bacteria that
infect human beings. 136 He named the antibacterial substance
liberated into the fluid in which the mold was grown "penicillin,"
after Penicillium notatum, the contaminant of the
staphylococcus colony that led to the discovery. 137 The most
famous episode of modern serendipitous drug discovery is
sildenafil, a drug Pfizer scientists were attempting to use as a
treatment for angina. 138 Although it failed to relieve angina pain,
some patients experienced erections as a side effect.
Independently, researchers at Johns Hopkins were working with
the effect of nitric oxide on the physiological relaxation of blood
vessels. 139 They discovered that the enzyme responsible for
nitric oxide in the body is localized in the penis and suggested
that nitric oxide was the transmitter for penile erection. 140
Because the action of nitric oxide was mediated by organic
molecules similar to that of sildenafil, the side effect of penile
erection reported by cardiac patients in the Pfizer study was
explained by the findings of the Hopkins group Together, the
discoveries led to the drug's indication for male erectile disorder,
and the blockbuster sildenafil (Viagra) for Pfizer.
Serendipitous discoveries that approved drugs may be used
for different diseases are even more common. Thalidomide was a
drug initially marketed as a sedative and antiemetic, widely
taken by pregnant women for the treatment of morning sickness
with the catastrophic result of thousands of children suffering
severe birth defects. 141 A few years later, it was administered to
a patient with mania and leprosy mainly for its sedative
effect.142 The patient's cutaneous symptoms nearly completely
resolved with the treatment, resurrecting thalidomide's promise
as an anti-inflammation agent. Its postulated mechanisms of
135 Thomas Ban, The Role of Serendipity in Drug Discovery, 8 DIALOGUES IN CLINICAL
NEUROSCIENCE 335, 339 (2006).
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Hossein Ghofrani et al., Sildenafil: From Angina to Erectile Dysfunction to Pulmonary
Hypertension and Beyond, 5 NAT. REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 689, 689 (2006).
139 Ban, supra note 135, at 342.
140 Id.
141 J.N. Gordon & P.M. Goggin, Thalidomide and Its Derivatives: Emerging From the
Wilderness, 79 POSTGRAD. MED. J. 127, 130 (2003).
142 Id. at 127.
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action led to academic research into alternative uses, especially
the treatment of tumors. 143
The tyrosine kinase inhibitor imatinib-Novartis's
blockbuster cancer drug marketed as Gleevec-has been studied
as a therapeutic agent for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis.
The rationale for those trials was based in part on clinical
observations demonstrating improved rheumatoid symptoms in
patients who received imatinib for their coexisting chronic
myelogenous leukemia. 144 Between 2000 and 2009, eleven
known drugs received a new anticancer indication based on
similar clinical observations. 145 "Except for the use of
thalidomide for the treatment of multiple myeloma, the other 10
drugs represented label extensions of known chemotherapeutic
agents." 146 Thus, identification of new indications through
clinical evaluation is a common form of drug repurposing.
B. Big Data and In Silico Screening
An emerging but as-of-yet less prominent means of
identifying and developing new drug uses is the application of
sophisticated algorithms based on current drug labels, as well as
computer-modeled projections, for new uses based on the known
mechanisms of action for current approved drugs. These
methods are sometimes referred to as in silico methods because
they involve computer simulation (in contrast to in vitro or in
vivo methods otherwise used in medical research). 147 This
process has been facilitated by pressures imposed by public and
academic institutions to make knowledge more readily available.
In 2001, academic journals began to require that authors using
microarrays deposit their data into repositories. 148 Since then,
more than one million microarray datasets have become
available, and the number is doubling every two years. 149 Other
kinds of molecular, clinical and epidemiological data are
becoming available at similar rates.
143 Id. at 129.
144 See Jorg H. W. Distler et al., Treatment of Pulmonary Fibrosis for Twenty Weeks With
Imatinib Mesylate in a Patient With Mixed Connective Tissue Disease, 58 ARTHRITIS &
RHEUMATISM 2538, 2541-42 (2008).
145 Sukhai et al., supra note 118, at 6750.
146 Id.
147 Stefan S. Tunev, Differences Between in Vitro, in Vivo, and in Silico Studies, MARSHAL
PROTOCOL KNOWLEDGE BASE,
http://mpkb.org/home/patients/assessing literature/in vitro studies
[http://perma.ce/ABP6-SVX4].
148 Monya Baker, Gene Data to Hit Milestone, 487 NATURE 282, 282-83 (2012).
149 Id.
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Cheminformatics approaches rely on the analysis and entry
of chemical compound characteristics, and analyze those
characteristics across commercially or publicly available
databases or compendia of molecular targets like the National
Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke
(NINDS)/Microsource US drug collection or the
Prestwick Chemical library. 150 The Keiser study noted above, for
example, compared
3,665 US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-
approved and investigational drugs against
hundreds of targets, defining each target by its
ligands." 151 Chemical similarities between drugs
and ligand sets predicted thousands of
unanticipated associations. Overall, 23 new drug-
target associations were confirmed. 152
Sivanesan Dakshanamurthy, at Georgetown's Lombardi
Cancer Institute, and his coauthors developed a computational
method called "train, match, fit, streamline" (TMFS) to map new
drug-target interaction space and predict new uses. The TMFS
method combines shape, topology, and chemical signatures,
including docking score and functional contact points of the
ligand, to predict potential drug-target interactions. Using the
TMFS method, they ran molecular fit computations on 3,671
FDA approved drugs across 2,335 human protein crystal
structures to discover promising repurposing opportunities for
an antihookworm agent to treat cancer and combined therapies
to treat otherwise unresponsive rheumatoid arthritis. 153
Other approaches aim at exploiting other forms of drug and
indication relationships, such as matching clinical side effects
and additional disease indications. GlaxoSmithKline researchers
Lun Yang and Pankaj Agarwal, for example, argued in a 2011
article-which overlapped in significant part with a GSK patent
on their discovery methods-that clinical side effects provide a
human phenotypic profile for any given drug, and that profile
150 Ruili Huang et al., The NCGC Pharmaceutical Collection: A Comprehensive Resource
of Clinically Approved Drugs Enabling Repurposing and Chemical Genomics, 3 ScI.
TRANSL. MED. 80 (2011); Workshop & Conference Proceedings, NAT'L INST.
NEUROLOGICAL DISORDERS & STROKE,
http://www.ninds'nih'gov/news and events/proceedings/Drug Screening Consortium
2002.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2017) [http://perma.ce/L6A7-SX23].
151 See Keiser et al., supra note 36.
152 Id.
153 S. Dakshanamurthy et al., Predicting New Indications for Approved Drugs Using a
Proteochemometric Method, 55 J. MED. CHEMISTRY 6832 (2012).
Drug Repurposing Ecosystem
can suggest additional disease indications. 154 They extracted
3,175 side effect-disease relationships by combining the
relationships from drug labels and the drug-disease
relationships from PharmGKB, an NIH-initiated central
knowledge sharing site that curates and mediates data and
researchers examining complex relationships between genes,
variants, drugs, diseases and pathways. 155 Yang and Agarwal
found that many relationships provided explicit repositioning
hypotheses, such as drugs causing hypoglycemia that were
potential candidates for diabetes. 156 Sean Ekins and Antony
Williams reviewed thirty-four studies over a six-year period and
determined that "a conservative estimate indicates at least 109
previously approved drugs have shown activity in vitro against
additional diseases different than those for which the drugs
were originally approved."157
No matter how effective big data methods become at
identifying promising compounds and even facilitating animal
testing data, they cannot, yet, directly establish either an
economically rational or a normative preference system for
selecting promising compounds for Phase II and Phase III trials.
Those trials comprise the most expensive aspects of FDA
approval and have been estimated to fail at 80% and 50% rates
respectively. 158 A single Phase III trial for Alzheimer's Disease
may cost up to $300-$400 million. 159 The current debate largely
revolves around putting in place incentives so that firms behave
as they do with de novo drug development and the most
profitable drugs' new uses rise to the top for clinical testing and
regulatory approval.
C. Public and Foundation Supported New Use Research
Publicly funded trial options for drug repurposing, as with all
drug development, are limited. 16 0 The NIH's National Center for
Advancing Translational Sciences has established a program
154 Lun Yang & Pankaj Agarwal, Systematic Drug Repositioning Based on Clinical Side-
Effects, 6 PLoS ONE e28025, at 1 (Dec. 21, 2011),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id= 10. 1371 /journal.pone.0028025
[http://perma.cc/FR2Z-DSQH].
155 Id. at 2.
156 Id. at 6.
157 Antony Williams, Finding Promiscuous Old Drugs for New Uses, 28 PHARM. RES. 1785
(2011).
158 John Arrowsmith, Trial Watch: Phase II Failures: 2008-2010, 10 NATURE REVIEWS
DRUG DISCOVERY 328, 328-329 (2011); John Arrowsmith, Trial Watch: Phase III and
Submission Failures: 2007-2010, 10 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 87 (2011).
159 Shineman et. al., supra note 53, at 513.
160 See Rebecca English et al., TRANSFORMING CLINICAL RESEARCH IN THE UNITED
STATES: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 73 (2010).
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called Discovering New Therapeutic Uses for Existing Molecules
(the "NCATS Program"). 161 Firms participating in NCATS
contribute compounds that advanced in clinical studies but were
unsuccessful for their original indication. 162 The NCATS
Program allows researchers to submit proposals to investigate a
compound for use in a particular disease area through two- and
three-year grants that fund through Phase IIA. 163 A successful
researcher owns any new intellectual property rights generated
by his or her work, while the contributing company owns the
first right to develop the product. 164
When clinical trials for new uses are publicly funded, it is
often indirectly. Because non-profit organizations, including
university researchers, encounter difficulty in acquiring
potential drugs from pharmaceutical firms because of extensive
legal, intellectual, and publication complexities, among other
hurdles, they purchase readily available approved drugs and
test them for other uses. 165 If clinical trials are successful,
researchers can publish their results and doctors can elect to
prescribe the drug off-label. 166 The Food and Drug
Administration's Rare Disease Repurposing Database; the
National Institutes of Health's pharmaceutical collection held by
its Therapeutics for Rare & Neglected Diseases program; and
the World Intellectual Property Organization's Re:Search, a
database of available intellectual property assets held to support
research on neglected tropical diseases, are also used to
facilitate access to publicly funded clinical trials for new uses. 167
161 National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences, NCATS, Programming and
Initiatives, NAT'L INST. HEALTH, https://ncats.nih.gov/about/center
[http://perma.cc/P68T-N7QVI.
162 Five More Pharmaceutical Companies Join NIH Initiative to Speed Therapeutic




164 Collaborative Research Agreement Between Pharmaceutical Research & Development,
L.L.C. (The Company) and Academic Medical Center, NAT'L CTR. FOR ADVANCING
TRANSLATIONAL SCI., https:Hncats.nih.gov/sites/default/files/NTU-CRA-JnJ.pdf
[http://perma.cc/79W2-W5WR].
165 Thayer, supra note 24.
166 See id.
167 K. Xu & T.R. Cot6, Database Identifies FDA-Approved Drugs with Potential To Be
Repurposed for Treatment of Orphan Diseases, 12 BRIEF BIOINFORM 341 (2011); NIH
Therapeutics for Rare and Neglected Diseases Program Announces Next Round of
Drug Development Projects, NAT'L INST. HEALTH,
http://www.nih.gov/news/health/nov2011/nhgri-15.htm [https://perma.cc/U2QG-D8ZA];
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Public agencies not only directly fund repurposing work, but
facilitate knowledge and resource sharing partnerships.
Auranofin, a rheumatoid arthritis agent first approved in 1985,
has shown promise treating Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia
(CLL). 168 CLL qualifies as a rare disease under the Orphan Drug
Act. 169 The treatment was developed through the Learning
Collaborative, a partnership between the Institute for
Advancing Medical Innovation (IAMI) at the University of
Kansas Medical Center (KUMC), the Leukemia & Lymphoma
Society (LLS), and the National Center for Advancing
Translational Sciences (NCATS) at NIH.170
There are also a limited number of private foundations that
support new use research, like Cures within Reach, the
Alzheimer's Drug Discovery Foundation, and the Michael J. Fox
Foundation. 171
D. Industry-University Partnerships
Firms that have adopted active repurposing programs have
also looked to both traditional and new partnerships with
academic research centers. Swiss pharmaceutical firm, Roche,
for example, interviewed its own researchers company-wide to
develop a list of more than 350 compounds, the Roche
Repurposing Compound Collection. 172 It then entered into an
agreement with the Harvard-MIT Broad Institute to design
experiments that might help Roche link a compound with a
patient population. 173 Roche shares information about its
compounds under a staggered arrangement. "Collaborators will
first get the compounds and their molecular weights. If they
uncover any interesting findings, more information will be
shared."174
Industry- academic partnerships are traditionally not so
comprehensive and directed at new use research. In more
168 Nora Yang, Auranofin for Chronic Lymphocytic Leukemia, NAT'L INST. HEALTH (Sept.
7, 2017), https://neats.nih.gov/trnd/projects/complete/auranofin-chronic-lymphocytic-
leukemia [https://perma.cc/6UYT-76BE].
169 Kesselheim, supra note 121.
170 Yang, supra note 168.
171 See ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE DISCOVERY FOUND., https://www.alzdiscovery.org/cognitive-
vitality/article/promis e-in-off-label-drugs-for-alzheim ers [https://perma.cc/8FQU-
3X5A]; CURES WITHIN REACH, http://www.cureswithinreach.org/
[https://perma.cc/YEP8-8A33]; MICHAEL J. Fox FOUND. FOR PARKINSON'S RESEARCH,
https://www.michaeljfox.org/foundation/news.html [https://perma.cc/3KWK-5MQD].
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orthodox relationships, pharmaceutical firms encounter
unexpected results and reach out to academic specialists to
undertake further investigation. Dasatinib, an agent used to
inhibit tumor growth, was originally developed from a Bristol-
Myers Squibb program targeting the tryosine kinase Lck. 175
During the study of dasatinib, researchers noticed that the drug
had off-target effects against other tyrosine kinases, including
Abl, which is involved in Philadelphia chromosome-positive
leukemia. 176 BMS reached out to Charles Sawyer at the
University of California, Los Angeles to adapt dasatinib for Abl,
which led to FDA approval for its use in treating imatinib-
resistant Philadelphia chromosome-positive leukemia. 177
Indeed, repurposing has given birth to its own industry,
where secondary firms "hire away molecules, perhaps 10 to 20 at
a time, choosing only those that weren't abandoned for safety
reasons and aren't protected by composition of matter
patents." 178 Repurposing methods themselves are a thriving
source of patent activity. 179
E. Liability and Cost Factors Influencing New Use
Research Priorities
Although the literature is overwhelmingly focused on the
promise of developing new uses for old drugs through incentives
like commercialization rights, data exclusivity, and intellectual
property rights, there has been little discussion or research into
the relief from adverse incentives like products liability. 180
Incentives like market exclusivity and tax incentives may not
work where relief from product liability may. Even in the latter
case, if a drug has a global market potential (as most do), firms
may not invest in repurposing if a principal use in a global
market might be undermined.
In many cases, pharmaceutical firms refuse to develop new
uses not because they will not reap a proportionate award
175 DRUG REPURPOSING AND REPOSITIONING: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 34 (Sarah H. Beachy et
al. eds., 2014).
176 Id.
177 Id. at 34-35; Nell P. Shah et al., Overriding Imatinib Resistance with a Novel ABL
Kinase Inhibitor, 305 SCIENCE 399 (2004); Moshe Talpaz et al., Dasatinib in Imatinib-
Resistant Philadelphia Chromosome-Positive Leukemias, 354 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2531
(2006).
178 Thayer, supra note 24.
179 Cf. U.S. Patent Application No. 14/239,564, Publication No. 20140193517 (published
Jul. 10, 2014) (Pankaj Agarwal, Lun Yang, applicants).
180 But see Keving Outterson and Aaron Kesselheim, Improving Antibiotic Markets for
Long Term Sustainability 11 YALE J. HEALTH L. POL'Y & ETHICS 101, 122-23 (2011)
(describing eight-sector incentive scheme).
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through a new approval (although that may also be the case),
but because research into new uses may expose side effects
detrimental to the drug's primary market. Merck, for example,
discovered cardiovascular side effects for Vioxx while testing the
drug's potential for treating colon polyps, after FDA had
approved it as an analgesic. 181 Repurposing may create or
eliminate toxicity issues, since it may be delivered differently or
at a different dose for the new use. 182 Indeed, there is evidence
that Merck was aware of cardiovascular side effects with Vioxx
during clinical trials for its analgesic properties. 18 3
Despite the importance of product liability disincentives
(which may raise both safety issues and market signal issues-
even if no lawsuit is filed, product weaknesses can affect
revenue), there are few scholars in the drug repurposing debate
that propose any kind of relief from tort liability as a way of
encouraging pharmaceutical firms to undertake new use
research or to more openly share drug data including clinical
trial data. 184 If it is true that pharmaceutical firms fear
liabilities arising from new-use research, the incentives now
imagined to be necessary for more off-label research-like more
robust protection of method-of-use patents-may not generate
the kind of repurposing activity advocates say society will
realize as a result of those incentives.
Nor would relief from product liability be a logical or
practical approach to encouraging new use research. Product
181 Barry Meier, Merck Canceled an Early Study of Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/08/business/merck-canceled-an-early-study-of-
vioxx.html [https://perma.cc/Z5S8-Q35B]; see Statement of Sandra Kweder, Vioxx and
Drug Safety, Senate Finance Committee, Nov. 18, 2004 ("Merck contacted FDA on
September 27, 2004, to request a meeting to discuss with the Agency the Data Safety
Monitoring Board's decision to halt Merck's long-term study of Vioxx in patients at
increased risk of colon polyps. Merck and FDA officials met the next day, September
28, and during that meeting the company informed FDA of its decision to remove
Vioxx from the market voluntarily. The data presented demonstrated an increase in
risk in cardiovascular risk and stroke starting at the eighteen-month time point
compared to placebo."), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/99575.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DAX-NUXB].
182 See Thayer, supra note 24; Alex Berenson et al., Despite Warnings, Drug Giant Took
Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/business/despite-warnings-drug-giant-took-long-
path-to-vioxx-recall.html [https://perma.cc/E7EZ-98GE]. Litigation documents suggest
Merck knew even earlier than this, but it was this study that prompted Merck's
communications to FDA.
183 Joseph S. Ross, et. al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related to
Rofecoxib: A Case Study of Industry Documents From Rofecoxib Litigation, 299 JAMA
1800 (2008); Joseph S. Ross, et. al., Pooled Analysis of Rofecoxib Placebo-Controlled
Clinical Trial Data: Lessons for Postmarket Pharmaceutical Safety Surveillance, 169
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1976 (2009).
184 Efthimios Parasidis, Patients Over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure in the
Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 Wise. L. REV. 929 (2011).
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liability provides an important layer of review for drugs that
may escape the FDA's attention, in addition to making victims
whole for drugs that cause severe adverse events.18 5 Nothing
about repurposed drugs would alter this important aspect of
pharmaceutical regulation.
F. Off-Label Marketing
In addition to product liability, the current debate is largely
silent on the drug repurposing that is already common and
widespread: the marketing of drugs by pharmaceuticals for
indications that have not been approved by the FDA, or "off-
label marketing." 186 Typically, the FDA approves a drug for
specific uses based on substantial evidence of effectiveness.18 7
That evidence is statutorily defined as
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled
investigations, including clinical investigations, by
experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug
involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and
responsibly be concluded by such experts that the
drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have under the conditions of use
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling or proposed labeling thereof.188
When FDA approves a new drug or approves an already
marketed drug for a new indication, it only does so for claims
185 David Vladeck & David Kessler, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to
Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 Geo. L.J. 461, 463(2008) ("State damages
litigation helps uncover and assess risks that are not apparent to the agency during a
drug's approval process . . . The agency also wanted to avoid the "harsh implications"
of eliminating judicial recourse for consumers injured by dangerous drugs.").
186 Ryan Abbott & Ian Ayres, Evidence and Extrapolation: Mechanisms for Regulating
Off-Label Uses of Drugs and Devices, 64 DuKE L.J. 378, 391 (2014) ("Under the
current regulatory regime, manufacturers opt for back-door approaches to developing
off-label revenue streams because of the "enormous amount of time and money"
required to seek FDA approval for a new use."); In re Gilead Sciences Securities
Litigation, 536 F.3d 1049, 1051 (9h Cir. 2008) ("Generally, [FDA] regulations prohibit
the marketing of drugs for non-FDA-approved uses, commonly referred to as 'off-label'
uses. For example, it would be considered off-label for a company to market a FDA-
approved HIV/AIDS drug as also being effective for fighting Hepatitis B infection if
such use of the drug had not been reviewed and approved by the FDA and included in
the drug's FDA-approved package labeling." (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted)).
187 Russell Katz, FDA: Evidentiary Standards for Drug Development and Approval, 1
NEURORX 307 (2004).
188 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2012).
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which are supported by evidence meeting this high standard.189
While firms may develop or become aware of other uses for their
medications that fall outside of the FDA's specific authorization,
the agency prohibits them from marketing the drugs for these
off-label uses. When firms do so, they are, strictly speaking,
"misbranding" drugs in violation of federal law. 190
The FDA's ban does not extend to doctors, however, who may
prescribe drugs for off-label uses when patient needs or the
standard of care requires it.191 Despite the flexibility given to
physicians to prescribe for unapproved uses, medical training
itself, including residency, offers little guidance on best practices
for off-label prescription practices, and the American Medical
Association and other professional organizations have offered
little advice on the matter. 192 Ambiguity is even entrenched in
federal reimbursement programs like Medicare and Medicaid-
which, under the law, should not reimburse for off-label uses
except as recognized in specific compendia, but which, in
practice, routinely reimburse for off-label use even outside those
sources.
193
Off-label marketing and prescription therefore operate in a
vast legal gray zone. According to some estimates, off-label
prescriptions account for 20% of all prescriptions, totaling more
than $40 billion in sales annually. 194 80% of all drug
prescriptions for children are off-label, and between 80 and 90%
of all drug prescriptions for rare diseases are off-label. 195
Pharmaceutical firms may not market off-label uses; physicians
may, and arguably must, when the standard of care requires it.
In between, the information is shaped by multiple actors with
189 Id.
190 21 C.F.R. §202.1(e)(4)(i)(a); United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, 822 F.3d 613 (2d
Cir. 2016).
191 Scheineson & Cuevas, supra note 134, at 202-03.
192 Rebecca Dresser & Joel Frader, Off-Label Prescribing: A Call for Heightened
Professional and Government Oversight, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 476, 480 (2009).
193 J. Cohen et al., Off-Label Use Reimbursement, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 391, 394 (2009).
194 Abbott & Ayres, supra note 186, at 388 ("Off label use is common: 'for the 3 leading
drugs in each of the 15 leading drug classes, off-label use accounts for approximately
21% of prescriptions.' Moreover, off-label uses may be the norm in some areas of
practice such as oncology, pain management, and palliative care, and in some patient
populations, such as children, the elderly, and the severely ill. For example, about
80% of all drug prescriptions for children are off-label, and between 80 and 90 percent
of all drug prescriptions for rare diseases are off label."); Michael Bobelian, J&J's $2.2
Billion Settlement Won't Stop Big Pharma's Addiction to Off-Label Sales, FORBES (Nov.
12, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelbobelian/2013/11/12/jjs-2-2-billion-
settlement-wont-stop -big-pharmas -addiction-to-off-label-sales [https://perma.cc/DJA8-
CZV4].
195 James O'Reilly & Amy Dalal, Off Label or Out of Bounds: Prescriber and Marketer
Liability for Unapproved Uses of FDA-Approved Drugs, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 295, 298
(2003).
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different incentives. Academic researchers are free to study
approved drugs for new uses and publish their findings.
Physicians may request information from pharmaceutical firms
(who know best the literature on alternative uses of their
products and who in some cases pay for published studies) who
may, under those circumstances, lawfully provide it.196
It is, in fact, the off-label market that causes the most
difficulty in the drug repurposing context. Proponents of
additional incentives for new use research argue that research
investments will never be recouped because physicians may
prescribe generic versions of an approved drug even where a
valid, new method-of-use patent has been granted on a second
indication by the original drug applicant. 197 The FDA and
scholars sympathetic to the prohibition it enforces believe that
the policy saves patients from injury or death caused by medical
treatments unsupported by adequate evidence as to safety or
efficacy, while allowing physicians flexibility to effectively treat
patients. 198
Indeed, it is an underexplored question in the current
literature as to whether incentives for formal, legal approval of
alternative uses may nevertheless fail to overcome the
incentives for illegal marketing. 199 The off-label market
represents a key channel of many drugs' revenue streams.200 In
2007, Bristol-Myers Squibb paid $515 million to settle various
civil allegations, including its promotion of the antipsychotic
drug, aripiprazole (Abilify). 20 1 Two years later, Eli Lilly paid
196 Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion: Balancing Public Health
Goals and Commercial Speech, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 225, 256 (2011).
197 Roin, supra note 26 ("Pharmaceutical companies almost never have access to the
information they need to enforce a new-use patent. When physicians prescribe a drug
to a patient to treat a particular indication, the patient's medical condition is
confidential information. Physicians sometimes disclose the prescribed indication to
pharmacists and insurers, especially when required as a condition for insurance
coverage. However, they almost never share that information with pharmaceutical
companies. Without access to patient-level information, pharmaceutical companies
cannot enforce their new-use patents to charge insurers when physicians prescribe an
off-patent drug for a patented indication.").
198 JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES: THE BENEFITS, RISKS, AND COSTS OF PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS (2004); Philip M. Rosoff & Doraine Lambelet Coleman, The Case for Legal
Regulation of Physicians' Off-Label Prescribing, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 653
(2011).
199 Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use Rethinking the Role of the FDA,
358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1427, 1427-28 (2008).
200 The manufacturers hold an extraordinary amount of information about their products.
See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, U.S. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY
RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED REQUESTS FOR OFF-LABEL INFORMATION ABOUT
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES 2 (2011).
201 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay More Than $515
Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Drug Marketing and Pricing,
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$1.415 billion for its off-label marketing of Zyprexa. 202
GlaxoSmithKline agreed to plead guilty to criminal charges and
pay $3 billion to settle various government claims, including the
unlawful promotion of some of its drugs, like the anti-depressant
Paxil. 203 In its pursuit of Johnson & Johnson's Risperdal
marketing activities, the U.S. government alleged that the firm
made payments to physicians to influence them to write
prescriptions for off-label uses, provided misleading information
about the drug's safety and efficacy for alternative uses, and
paid kickbacks to a large provider of pharmaceuticals to nursing
homes to boost Risperdal's off-label sales. 204 Sales of
Risperdal increased from $172 million in 1994 to $1.726 billion
in 2005; in 2000, it was J&J's second-best selling drug. 20 5 A
significant portion of the sales earned during this era-about
75% as of May 2002-came from off-label prescriptions. 2 06
Over the last three years, a series of federal court decisions
have ensured that-constitutionally protected-off-label
marketing will increase rather than decrease. In 2013, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated the
prosecution of a pharmaceutical firm's representative's off-label
marketing on the basis that the government could not
criminalize truthful, non-misleading speech. 207 On August 7,
2015, Judge Paul Engelmayer of the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted a motion for a
preliminary injunction against the FDA for threatening to
prosecute Amarin Pharmaceuticals for off-label marketing of its
triglyceride-lowering medication based on commercial speech
that was otherwise protected by the First Amendment. 208 Both
cases, Caronia and Amarin, strongly suggest firms will become
more aggressive in challenging FDA limitations on their off-
label marketing activity. In United States ex rel. Polansky v.
Pfizer, the Second Circuit questioned in dicta the fundamental
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/Pr/2007/September/07 civ 782.html
[https://perma.cc/58AW-Z3SN].
202 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay $1.415
Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zyprexa,
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/Pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html
[https://perma.cc/RZ7T-VNHK].




201 Scheineson & Cuevas, supra note 134, at 201.
208 Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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tie between off-label promotion and liability under the federal
False Claims Act. 209
G. Evergreening
Off-label marketing represents, in essence, the unregulated
ways in which pharmaceutical firms repurpose drugs. The
formal, regulated means by which firms repurpose drugs-often
the aforementioned section 505(b)(2) pathway-are difficult in
concept and practice to distinguish from "evergreening."
Evergreening refers to a wide range of pharmaceutical firm
strategies for extending the exclusive market for a drug,
including, most relevantly here, patenting peripheral aspects of
drugs, like their coating or normal metabolites, in order to
extend market exclusivity. 210 Most reforms will face the
principle obstacle of drawing the distinction between
modifications that represent the improvements in medical
therapy that repurposing advocates desire and those intended to
artificially extent the period for which firms can charge high
prices on the underlying drug. GlaxoSmithKline, for example,
secured ten patents unrelated to Paxil's active ingredient, the
last of which would have expired in 2019 had those patents gone
unchallenged. 211 In the current debate, the line between
practices largely criticized as efforts to raise drug prices and
efforts praised as new-use research is impliedly sharp and
distinct, whereas the distortions rendered by new use incentives
would almost certainly create entanglements between "valid"
and "invalid" assertions of data exclusivity or intellectual
property protection. As Arti Rai and Grant Rice have noted, "all
types of use patents get caught up in debates over patent
'evergreening.' 212
Evergreening strategies are adopted not only in the patent
context, but also in the various market exclusivity regimes
administered by FDA. The manufacturers of loratidine
(Claritin) and metformin (Glucophage) petitioned Congress for
extended market exclusivity based on those regimes, and in the
case of ranitidine (Zantac), a legal technicality gave the
209 See United States ex rel. Polansky v. Pfizer, 822 F.3d 613, 619-20 (2d Cir.
2016); Pacira Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, No. 15-7055 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2015).
210 Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs be Patentable? A Comparative Perspective, 17 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 297 (2015).
211 C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and
Effective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 328 (2012).
212 Rai & Rice, supra note 48.
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manufacturer nearly seven more years of market protection. 213
Indeed, a relatively comprehensive study undertaken by the
Federal Trade Commission cited occasions where companies
registered duplicative or otherwise inappropriate modifications
precisely to prevent lower-cost generic alternatives from being
marketed. 214 Such patenting strategies are part of a larger set of
tactics, which also include new formulations and other product
line extensions that can lengthen market exclusivity for
therapies facing generic entry.
IV. METFORMIN AND THE DRUG REPURPOSING ECOSYSTEM
Because the process by which drugs become repurposed is
complex, perhaps too complex to design accurate aggregate
studies, case study methodology provides an effective research
method by which to understand multiple variables that may not
be easily adapted to other research designs:
[C]ase studies are pertinent when . . . research
addresses either a descriptive question-"What is
happening or has happened?"-or an explanatory
question-"How or why did something happen?" As
contrasting examples, alternative research methods
are more appropriate when addressing two other
types of questions: an initiative's effectiveness in
producing a particular outcome (experiments and
quasi-experiments address this question) and how
often something has happened (surveys address
this question). However, the other methods are not
likely to provide the rich descriptions or the
insightful explanations that might arise from doing
a case study.215
Metformin provides a representative case for what has been
posed as the drug repurposing problem. One of the leading
treatments for type II diabetes mellitus in the United States,
213 Glaxo Patent on Zantac Gets Extension, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/22/business/glaxo-patent-on-zantac-gets-
extension.html [https://perma.cc/YQ66-PC3Z].
214 Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION A-44, A-45 (July 2002).
215 ROBERT K. YIN, A (Very) Brief Refresher on the Case Study Method, in APPLICATIONS OF
CASE STUDY RESEARCH 5 (2012), http://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-
binaries/41407 1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WR4-SKSC].
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metformin-marketed as Glucophage by Bristol-Myers Squibb-
was approved for marketing in 1995. Because its composition-of-
matter patent had expired, metformin enjoyed only the five-year
exclusivity extended to it by the Hatch-Waxman Act. Although it
became an immediate blockbuster for Bristol-Myers Squibb and
its licensing partner, Merck KGaA, neither firm has endeavored
to move metformin into Phase II or Phase III trials for
metformin's many promising alternative uses: nonalcoholic fatty
liver disease, polycystic ovary syndrome, Alzheimer's disease,
obesity, and cancer. According to the narrative now prevailing in
the scholarly literature, 1) those firms have not sought to exploit
metformin's alternative uses because there is no incentive to do
so, and 2) without incentives extended to firms like BMS and
Merck KGaA, society will not realize many promising
treatments made available through repurposing.
A. Metformin's Origins
Metformin (dimethyl biguanide) is one of three biguanides
originally derived from the French hlac.216 In its natural form, it
has been used to treat symptoms of diabetes since medieval
times.217
Its pharmacology and toxicology were studied in Paris
and its structure was identified in Edinburgh. 218 In 1922,
metformin was synthesized in Dublin and shown to lower
blood glucose with fewer gastrointestinal adverse effects than
its predecessors. 219 However, in the same year, insulin was
used for the first time, distracting interest from other
glucose-lowering drugs. 220
Jean Sterne, a physician and clinical pharmacologist who
trained in diabetology under Francis Rathery at the H6pital de
la Pitie in Paris, 221 held positions in 1956 at Aron Laboratories
(later acquired by Lipha Pharmaceuticals, which was in turn
acquired by Merck KGaA) and the H6pital Laennec in Paris.
Sterne selected metformin for clinical development and proposed
216 Ripudaman S. Hundal & Silvio E. Inzucchi, Metformin: New Understandings, New
Uses, 63 DRUGS 1879, 1879 (2003).
217 Id.
218 Gillian Shenfield, Metformin: Myths, Misunderstandings and Lessons from History, 36
AUSTRALIAN PRESCRIBER 38 (2013).
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Gauri R. Patade & A. Rosalind Marita, Metformin: A Journey from the Countryside to
the Bedside, 1 J. OBESITY & METABOLIC RES. 127, 127-30 (2014).
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the name "Glucophage" (glucose eater). 222 His results were
published in 1957.223
In Sterne's trials, metformin lowered blood glucose in
patients with type II diabetes, but not in people without
diabetes. 224 Unlike sulfonylureas-first generation diabetes
drugs-metformin did not stimulate insulin release, but instead
increased its peripheral uptake and also reduced the release of
glucose from the liver.225 The other two biguanides, phenformin
and buformin, were found to be more potent and, in fact,
phenformin was given FDA marketing authorization by Ceiba-
Geigy (now Novartis) in 1959. 226 Increasing rates of lactic
acidosis in diabetes patients taking phenformin led to a steep
decline in prescriptions by 1973 and formal FDA cancellation of
Ciba-Geigy's new drug application in 1979.227
The window between the steep decline in phenformin
prescriptions and its ultimate cancellation coincided with a
critical period of growth in type II diabetes as a national public
health problem. Between 1973 and 1978, the number of
Americans diagnosed with type II diabetes increased by one
million in absolute numbers and rose from 2.04% to 2.37% of the
U.S. population. 228 Even in the 1970s, the trends that eventually
led to 20% or more of population living with type II diabetes
were apparent: more sedentary routines, higher caloric intakes,
and increasing obesity. 229 Because these trends have become
global, so has the potential market for effective diabetes
drugs. 230
222 Clifford J. Bailey & Caroline Day, Metformin: Its Botanical Background, 21 PRACT.
DIABETES INTL 115 (2004).
223 Id.
224 Shenfield, supra note 218.
225 Id.
226 See Phenformin Hydrochloride; Withdrawal of Approval of New Drug Application;
Final Decision, 44 Fed. Reg. 20,967 (Apr. 6, 1979).
221 Id; see Shun C. Kwong & Jeffrey Brubacher, Phenformin and Lactic Acidosis: A Case
Report and Review, 16 J. EMERGENCY MED. 881 (1998).
228 Div. of Diabetes Translation, Long-term Trends in Diabetes, NAT'L DIABETES
SURVEILLANCE SYs. (Apr. 2017),
http://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/statistics/slides/long term trends.pdf
[https://perma.cc/64DJ-VE87].
229 See id.; Frank B. Hu, Globalization of Diabetes: The Role of Diet, Lifestyle, and Genes,
34 DIABETES CARE 1249 (2011).
230 Hu, supra note 229.
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B. The Entry and Expansion of Metformin in the
Healthcare System
1. The Industrial Partnership Behind Glucophage
Type II diabetes was therefore precisely the kind of disease
that represented strong market potential for any given
pharmaceutical firm, and the exit of phenformin from the U.S.
market opened the possibility for a non-insulin therapy.
Metformin had enjoyed a long life without phenformin's adverse
effects in France, Sweden and, after 1977, Canada. 231 Despite
the promising role metformin might play in the U.S. market, the
patents on the composition of metformin were not only held by
others, but were either expired or close to expiring. 232 Hatch-
Waxman did not become law in the U.S. until 1984, around the
same time that Lipha enjoyed increasing success with
Glucophage in Europe and other markets around the world.
Lipha commenced clinical trials for an oral therapy of metformin
in 1987. It sought a marketing partner in the United States
because the Hatch-Waxman exclusivity window was so narrow
that it needed a partner with an established market presence.
Indeed, the merger between Bristol-Myers and Squibb largely
combined the marketing strengths of the former with the
research strengths of the latter. 233 In 1994, Bristol-Myers
Squibb (BMS) licensed the right to market metformin from
Lipha. 234 It obtained FDA approval in 1995 under the
requirement that it conduct robust Phase IV surveillance
because of continuing fears over lactic acidosis. 235 In exchange,
Lipha received the right to market BMS's hypertension drug
Fosinopril in France.236
231 O.J. Lucis, The Status of Metformin in Canada, 128 CANADIAN MED. Assoc. J. 24,
24 (1983).
232 U.S. Patent No. 3,960,949 (filed July 9, 1974).
233 BERT ROSENBLOOM, MARKETING CHANNELS: A MANAGEMENT VIEW 609 (2011).
234 Business Brief Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.: Rights to Diabetes Drug are Acquired
from Lipha, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 1994); FDA Advisory Panel Recommends Lipha
Pharma Diabetes Drug, Dow JONES NEWS SERV. (Mar. 18, 1994).
235 Id.; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 2 (Mar. 31,
1994); Ralph A. DeFronzo et al., Efficacy of Metformin in Patients with Non-
Insulin-Dependent Diabetes Mellitus, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 541, 541 (1995);
Harry C.S. Howlett & Clifford J. Bailey, A Risk-Benefit Assessment of Metformin
in Type II Diabetes Mellitus, 20 DRUG SAFETY 489 (1999); see also Ronald
Innerfield, Letter to the Editor: Metform in-Associated Mortality in U.S. Studies,
334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1612-13 (1996) (noting FDA post-marketing surveillance
protocol).
236 Royal Soc'y of Chemistry, Lipha, France/US Signs Agreement with Bristol-
Myers Squibb, BULL. INT'L D'INFORMATION DROIT ET PHARMACIE (May 4, 1995).
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2. The Marketing Behind Glucophage as
Blockbuster
BMS undertook one of the largest and most expansive
marketing campaigns in history, one that aimed not only to
increase awareness of Glucophage, but to expand awareness of
type II diabetes. While early marketing for Glucophage focused
on health care providers and public awareness campaigns for
medical treatment of diabetes, the FDA's flexibility on direct-to-
consumer advertising gave BMS more outlets for promoting
metformin sales. 237 BMS began reaching out to consumers
through sources aimed primarily towards women, such as
Ladies' Home Journal, Good Housekeeping, Better Homes and
Gardens, 238 and Star Style. 239 BMS also sought to reach a
slightly wider audience through sources such as the National
Enquirer and Star magazine. 240
Glucophage was introduced on the market in 1995.241 It
turned almost immediately into a blockbuster. 242 In 1997,
sales of Glucophage increased by seventy-four percent, 243 and
it became the leading branded product in the United States
for the treatment of type II diabetes. 244 Glucophage
maintained its status as the leading branded type II diabetes
medication in 1998,245 with sales increasing another forty-
nine percent. 246 In 1999, Glucophage's sales increased an
additional fifty-three percent, 247 exceeding one billion
237 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 27 (Mar. 31, 1997); Gary
Humphreys, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Under Fire, 87 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (2009), http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/8/09-040809/en/
[https://perma.cc/GPH8-5R4K] ("Direct-to-consumer advertising of drugs has
been legal in the USA since 1985, but only really took off in 1997 when the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) eased up on a rule obliging companies to offer a
detailed list of side-effects in their infomercials (long format television
commercials. Since then the industry has poured money into this form of
promotion, spending just under US$5 billion last year alone.").
238 See STARCH COMPARABLE ADVERTISEMENTS, JANUARY-JUNE 1999 (1999),
http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/zjnmO186 [https://
perma.cc/8UMC-YCBA].
239 See MCCALL'S STARSTYLE 91 (Feb. 2000), http://industrydocuments.library.
ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/hzck0070 [http://perma.cc/DK99-HBKK].
240 See NATIONAL ENQUIRER/STAR 7 (Aug. 11, 1998),
http://industrydocuments.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/docs/hgwx0061 [https://
perma.cc/QTC7-KEPK].
241 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 22 (Mar. 29, 1995).
242 Id. at 22; Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 22-23 (Mar.
28, 1996).
243 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., supra note 237, at 27.
244 Id. at 27.
245 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 23 (Mar. 31, 1998).
246 Id. at 27.
247 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 (Mar. 30, 1999).
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dollars. 248 It also increased its market share from approximately
twenty-seven percent to over thirty-one percent, 249 and was the
third-highest-selling drug marketed by BMS. 250 Glucophage
sales continued to increase in by thirty-two percent in 2000,251
and it remained one of BMS's top-selling medications 252 through
2001.253 In 2001, Glucophage's annual sales surpassed two
billion dollars.254 The entrance of generics onto the market
caused a steep decline in the sales of all Glucophage
formulations the following year. 255
3. The Evergreening of Glucophage
In preparation for Glucophage's loss of Hatch-Waxman
exclusivity, BMS undertook a number of measures. First, it
increased its marketing budget in an attempt to increase
demand specifically for Glucophage. 256 Second, BMS also sought
to increase sales from Glucophage by creating "improved
formulations" of the drug, developing two new drugs suitable for
marketing in 1999.257 In short, it evergreened.
The first formulation was an extended-release version of
Glucophage, Glucophage XR. 258 The extended release formula
required only one dose per day, which could improve treatment
compliance of patients by simplifying their drug regimens. 259 Its
slow-release mechanism also caused fewer side effects for
patients who did not tolerate standard Glucophage well. 260
Glucophage XR was one of the most heavily advertised
medications in 2001, with advertising costs exceeding eighty
million dollars. 261 The second, Glucovance, 262 combined
248 Id. at 20, 24.
249 Id. at 24.
250 Id. at 48.
251 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Mar. 30, 2000).
252 Id. at 2.
253 See Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 14 (Apr. 2, 2001)
[hereinafter, Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., 2001 Annual Report]; see also Bristol-
Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 29 (Apr. 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., 2002 Annual Report].
254 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., 2002 Annual Report, supra note 253, at 14.
255 Id. at 29.
256 See Wendy L. Bonifazi, Hard Sell: Drug Makers are Spending Billions on 'Direct-
to-Consumer' Ads. But Just How Effective are the Products?, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
25, 2002, 12:01 AM ET), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1016657742405551120.
257 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., supra note 247, at 23.
258 Id.
259 Otesa Middleton, Bristol-Myers: FDA OKs New Once-a-Day Form of Glucophage,
Dow JONES NEWS SERV. (Oct. 16, 2000).
260 Bonifazi, supra note 256.
261 Id.
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metformin with glyburide. 26 3 Glyburide is a sulfonylurea drug
which increases insulin secretion in type II diabetics, and
treatment with both glyburide and metformin can be superior to
treatment with either drug alone 26 4 by treating both insulin
resistance and insulin deficiency at the same time, with fewer
medications. 265 BMS's marketing schemes focused largely on
persuading doctors and patients to move from standard
Glucophage to one of these new formulations. 26 6
Both Glucophage XR and Glucovance received FDA approval
in 2000, and were launched the same year.267 At the end of the
year, sales were $50 million and $110 million, respectively. 26 8
The approval also earned BMS additional exclusivity on each
drug-until October 2003 for Glucophage XR and July 2003 for
Glucovance. 269 Sales increased substantially in 2001 for the
individual medications, with both drugs earning over three
hundred million dollars, and the Glucophage franchise overall
had a forty-two percent increase in sales. 270 In 2002, sales of
both Glucophage XR and Glucovance exceeded sales of standard
Glucophage. 271 However, Glucophage franchise sales dropped
sixty-seven percent thereafter due to a decrease in sales of
standard Glucophage, Glucophage XR, and Glucovance. 272 BMS
offered coupons for the new indications in popular outlets like
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal as well as on
its website, along with a range of diabetes management tools. 273
BMS made an additional move to expand profitability of the
Glucophage franchise through seeking an extension of the
exclusivity periods by completing clinical studies of Glucophage
on children. 274 21 U.S.C. § 355a permits an applicant, at the
request of the FDA, to gain six additional months of market
exclusivity for an already-marketed drug in exchange for
performing clinical studies in pediatric patients 275 to assess the
262 Rebecca Thomas, SMARTMONEY.COM: Buffing Up the Blockbusters, Dow
JONES NEWS SERV. (Aug. 7, 2000).
263 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., supra note 247, at 20.
264 DeFronzo et al., supra note 235.
265 Thomas, supra note 262.
266 Middleton, supra note 259.
261 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., supra note 247, at 20.
268 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., supra note 251, at 20.
269 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., 2001 Annual Report, supra note 253, at 3.
270 Id. at 16.
271 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., 2002 Annual Report, supra note 253, at 3.
272 Id. at 29.
273 ROSENBLOOM, supra note 233, at 614.
274 Bristol-Myers' Glucophage Gets Extended FDA Exclusivity, Dow JONES NEWS
SERV. (Mar. 20, 2000).
275 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)(1).
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safety, efficacy, and pharmacokinetic profile of the drug in
children. 276 BMS performed pediatric studies on Glucophage,
receiving approval for a six-month extension of exclusivity in
2000, which extended the termination of Glucophage's
exclusivity period 277 from March 2000278 to September 2000.279
BMS subsequently earned a six-month pediatric extension for
Glucovance as well, extending its exclusivity from July 2003
until January 2004.280
Initially, BMS argued that its successful pediatric studies
were sufficient to merit a new indication, and, as a result, it was
entitled not only to the six-month pediatric extension but also to
an additional three-year exclusivity period for a new
indication. 281 At the time, pending legislation might have
granted BMS a three-year exclusivity extension for children's
versions of Glucophage. However, BMS was lobbying for a total
extension covering both adults and children. 28 2 Some members
of Congress were supportive of BMS's position based on the
same rationale that underpins current arguments in favor of
incentives for new-use research. 28 3 Although pediatric studies
are comparatively low-cost-about $500,000 to $15 million-
they can be risky and burdensome for drug companies. 284
Liability and informed consent present problems in pediatric
studies, and adverse reactions in participants can lead to
negative publicity and damage drug sales for all age groups. 28 5
Others regarded BMS's efforts as a "very serious" abuse of
Hatch-Waxman procedures, 286 and ultimately prevailed in
limiting BMS to an additional six months for all patients and
indications. 28 7
276 Bristol-Myers' Glucophage Gets Extended FDA Exclusivity, supra note 274.
277 Id.
278 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., supra note 245, at 3.
279 Bristol-Myers' Glucophage Gets Extended FDA Exclusivity, supra note 274.
280 Bristol-Myers Squibb, Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 9 (Mar. 28, 2003).
281 147 Cong. Rec. H 10,200-212 (Nov. 13, 2001).
282 Why You Still Can't Buy Cheaper Generics, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2001, at F02.
283 147 CONG. REC. H10,200 (Dec. 18, 2001).
284 Christopher-Paul Milne & Jon B. Bruss, The Economics of Pediatric
Formulation Development for Off-Patent Drugs, 30 CLIN. THERAPEUTICS 2138
(2008); Rachel Zimmerman, Child Play: Pharmaceutical Firms Win Big on Plan
to Test Adult Drugs on Kids By Doing Inexpensive Trials, They Gain 6 More
Months Free from Generic Rivals FDA: Law Does Some Good, WALL ST. J., Feb.
5, 2001, at Al.
285 Id.
286 147 CONG. REC. H10,200-212 (Nov. 13, 2001).
287 Bristol-Myers' Glucophage Gets Extended FDA Exclusivity, supra note 274.
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4. Off-Label Marketing of Glucophage
The evidence as to Bristol-Myers Squibb's off-label marketing
of Glucophage is indirect. 288 A 1998 FDA warning letter
determined that BMS had issued misleading claims to
physicians both as to metformin's effect on insulin resistance
and as to its efficacy for promoting weight loss. 289 BMS's
settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice for off-label
marketing of Abilify included claims related to improper
physician inducements to prescribe Glucophage, although no
specific allegation tied those inducements to off-label uses. 290
5. Glucophage's Global Market
BMS expanded Glucophage (the branded name of generic
metformin) into international markets. 291 In March 2013, BMS
began collaborating with Merck KGaA (which had absorbed
Lipha in 1996) to co-promote Glucophage in China through a
profit-sharing agreement. 292 They distributed several
formulations of Glucophage, including Glucovance, Glucophage
XR, and a Glucophage Powder packaged in sachets.293 BMS and
Merck also collaborated to provide diabetes-related health and
medical information to patients, as well as education for
healthcare professionals. 294 BMS also markets a combination
drug, Xigduo, in the European Union. 295 Xigduo combines
metformin with dapagliflozin. 296
288 Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Strategies and Practices in Off-Label Marketing of
Pharmaceuticals: A Retrospective Analysis of Whistleblower Complaints, 8 PLOS MED.
e1000431, at 1 (2011).






290 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bristol-Myers Squibb to Pay More Than $515
Million to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Drug Marketing and Pricing (Sept. 28, 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/September/07 civ 782.html
[https://perma.cc/R329-VQS7].
291 See Merck Serono Signs Diabetes Partnership with BMS in China, PMLIvE (Mar.
20, 2013),
http://www.pmlive.com/pharma news/merck serono signs diabetes partnership with
bins in china 468347 [https://perma.cc/3ZSR-DULE]; Lisa Nainggolan,
Canagliflozin/Metformin Combo Finally Approved in US, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 11,
2014), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/829695 [https://perma.cc/A64E-HD2L].
292 Merck KGaA Q2 2015, CHINA PHARMACEUTICALS & HEALTHCARE REP. 165 (Feb.
20, 2015).
293 Merck Serono Signs Diabetes with BMS in China, supra note 291.
294 Id.
295 Nainggolan, supra note 291.
296 Id.
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Between BMS's marketing authorization and the end of its
Glucophage, Glucophage XR, and Glucovance exclusivity
windows, the percentage of the American population living with
type II diabetes increased from 2.89% to 4.93%; in absolute
numbers, the cases increased from 7.63 million to over 14
million. 297 The number of Americans living with diabetes has
increased at an accelerated rate since 2003, now totaling
approximately 22 million Americans.
C. The Ecosystem of Metformin Repurposing
The result of metformin's introduction and substantial
expansion was a large population of individuals on a metformin
regimen that were often afflicted by other illnesses or conditions
common in type II diabetes patients. 298 Metformin is the most
widely prescribed antihyperglycemic drug in the United States,
either alone or in combination with other drugs. 299 The entry of
metformin into the diabetes treatment portfolio available to
treating physicians and academic researchers immediately drew
the attention of the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive
and Kidney Diseases, which from 1997 onward sponsored a
number of conferences and workshops investigating metformin's
mechanisms of action. 300 Metformin repurposing occurred not
through private sector incentives, but through university
research made possible by large numbers of patients and free
sharing of information; serendipitous discoveries made in the
process of that research; and observant physicians who noticed
and reported the alternative possibilities for metformin based on
patient outcomes.
As a result of metformin's trajectory in the academic, clinical,
and health care systems, it has been discovered that it promotes
297 Div. of Diabetes Translation, supra note 228.
298 Diabetes Prevention Program Research Grp., Reduction in the Incidence of Type II
Diabetes with Lifestyle Intervention or Metformin, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 393, 393-403
(2002).
299 Christian Hampp et al., Use of Antidiabetic Drugs in the U.S., 2003-2012, DIABETES
CARE (Mar. 12, 2014),
http://care.diabetesjournals.org/content/diacare/early/2014/03/04/dc13-2289.full.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MS63-UZU7] ("In 2012, 154.5 million prescriptions were dispensed
for antidiabetic drugs, 78.4% of which were for noninsulin antidiabetic drugs (Table 1).
About one in every two noninsulin antidiabetic drug prescriptions was for single-
ingredient metformin, which was used by 11.8 million of 16.3 million noninsulin
antidiabetic drug users (72.3%).").
300 Metformin Pharmacogenomics, NAT'L INST. DIABETES & DIGESTIVE & KIDNEY DISEASES
(June 6, 2012), http://www.niddk.nih.gov/news/events-calendar/Pages/metformin-
pharmacogenomic.aspx [https://perma.cc/YX7A-2B7T]; Diabetes Prevention Program




weight reduction (at least in the short-term); decreases
hyperinsulinaemia; improves lipid profiles; enhances endothelial
function; 301 and is associated, although not uniformly, with a
reduced risk of cardiovascular-related death. 302 Unlike
phenformin and buformin, metformin has a much lower risk of
lactic acidosis, and the few recorded cases have only occurred in
patients for whom metformin was contraindicated due to
conditions such as renal insufficiency or abnormal liver
function. 303 In addition, there are no known negative effects
from use during the first trimester of pregnancy, though
metformin use during the third trimester may increase the risk
of pre-eclampsia and perinatal mortality.304
Metformin's precise mechanism of action remains unclear.305
Recent studies suggest that it primarily acts by decreasing
glucose production in the liver.306 In addition, metformin seems
to stimulate glucose uptake by skeletal muscle, adipose tissue,
and the small intestines.307 It may also ameliorate the negative
effect of high glucose and lipid levels on insulin action and the
secretion of insulin by pancreatic cells. 308 Metformin has been
explored as a treatment for various conditions other than type II
diabetes, including polycystic ovary syndrome,3 09 HIV-associated
metabolic abnormalities, and dementia. 310 These alternative
uses, none of which have been approved by the FDA, represent
the quagmire that alternative uses pose: the absence of
incentives to invest in Phase II and Phase III trials for these
alternative indications, the argument goes, deprives patients of
potentially life-enhancing and life-saving treatments.
301 Hundal & Inzucchi, supra note 216, at 1880.
302 Aaron C. Pawlyk et al., Metformin Pharmacogenomics: Current Status and Future
Directions, 63 DIABETES 2590, 2591 (2014).
303 Robert I. Misbin, The Phantom of Lactic Acidosis due to Metformin in Patients with
Diabetes, 27 DIABETES CARE 1791 (2004).
304 Carlo M. Rotella et al., Metformin Beyond Diabetes: New Life for an Old Drug, 2
CURRENT DIABETES REV. 307, 311 (2006).
305 Li Gong et al., Metformin Pathways: Pharmacokinetics and Pharmacodynamics, 22
PHARMACOGENET GENOMICS 820, 823 (2012) ("The molecular mechanisms underlying
metformin action appear to be complex and remain a topic of considerable debate.").
306 Id.; see also Pawlyk et al., supra note 302.
30 Pawlyk et al., supra note 302, at 2592.
308 Marc L. Reitman & Eric E. Schadt, Pharmacogenetics of Metformin Response: A Step
in the Path Toward Personalized Medicine, 117 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1226 (2007).
309 Hundal & Inzucchi, supra note 216, at 1887; Rotella et al., supra note 304, at 310.
310 Karen Kreeger, The Many Faces of Metformin, PENN MED. NEWS BLOG: ARCHIVES (Jan.
30, 2013), http://news.pennmedicine.org/blog/2013/01 /the-many-faces-of-
metformin.html [https://perma.cc/A8N8-5CKE]; see also Megan Brooks, Metformin
Cuts Dementia Risk in Type 11 Diabetes, MEDSCAPE MED. NEWS (July 16, 2013),
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/807886 [https://perma.cc/5CT9-TB6T].
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1. Polycystic Ovary Syndrome
Polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS) is the most common cause
of female infertility in the United States. 311 Patients with
polycystic ovary syndrome frequently suffer from insulin
resistance and hyperinsulinaemia-both also commonly found in
type II diabetics-which is thought to contribute significantly to
the disease by increasing ovarian androgen secretion and
decreasing the production of sex-hormone binding globulin
which removes excess testosterone from the system. 312 Doctors
treating women afflicted by polycystic ovary syndrome noticed
that the condition affected obese women at higher rates and, for
those also suffering from type II diabetes, treatment with
metformin appeared to decrease body weight, insulin levels, and
testosterone levels and lowered progesterone response to human
chorionic gonadotropin. 313 In doing so, treatment also improves
menstrual cycles and ovulatory function. 314 Continuation of
metformin throughout pregnancy for polycystic ovary syndrome
patients has been associated with a decline in miscarriage
rate.315
Routine clinical observation of metformin's performance in
treating polycystic ovary syndrome prompted academic
researchers to investigate which aspects of metformin's
properties targeted which biological mechanisms. Beginning
with a series of studies undertaken by John Nestler at the
Medical College of Richmond (Virginia Commonwealth
University) in 1997 and funded by the National Institutes of
Health, clinical researchers showed that metformin decreased
insulin levels and that hyperinsulinemia stimulates cytochrome
P450c17a, a key enzyme in ovarian androgen production. 316 A
subsequent study by Nestler and his collaborators also used
311 Infertility, U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc. gov/reproductivehealth/infertility/ [https://perma.cc/5AKQ-SAK3]
("PCOS is a hormone imbalance problem that can interfere with normal ovulation.
PCOS is the most common cause of female infertility.").
312 Hundal & Inzucchi, supra note 216, at 1887.
313 Id.
314 See Richard Fleming et al., Ovarian Function and Metabolic Factors in Women with
Oligomenorrhea Treated with Metformin in a Randomized Double Blind Placebo-
Controled Trial, 87 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 569, 569-74 (2002); see
also Sandro Gerlo et al., Randomized, Double Blind Placebo-Controlled Trial: Effects
of Myo-inositol on Ovarian Function and Metabolic Factors in Women with PCOS, 11
EUR. REV. MED. & PHARMACOLOGICAL So. 347 (2007).
315 Daniela J. Jakubowicz et al., Effects of Metformin on Early Pregnancy Loss in the
Polycystic Ovary Syndrome, 87 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 524 (2002).
316 John E. Nestler & Daniela J. Jakubowicz, Decreases in Ovarian Cytochrome
P450c1 7a Activity and Serum Free Testosterone after Reduction of Insulin
Secretion in Polycystic Ovary Syndrome, 335 NEw ENG. J. MED. 617, 617-18
(1996).
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metformin to prove that hyperinsulinemia and insulin
resistance were features of PCOS in both obese and non-obese
women. 317 After these studies, Nestler and his collaborators then
studied the effect of metformin on ovulation in PCOS patients.
They found that, after thirty-four days of metformin treatment,
non-diabetic participants had increases in both spontaneous
ovulation and clomiphene-induced ovulation compared to
participants not receiving metformin. The result of these
findings, published in the New England Journal of Medicine,
caused the widespread off-label prescription of metformin to
treat polycystic ovary syndrome. 318
Despite the long-standing rationale for using metformin in
PCOS studies and prescribing it for off-label use in the
treatment of PCOS, Corrine Welt at Massachusetts General
Hospital has argued that metformin may not function in the
traditionally understood way. 319 In a fourteen-week study of
non-diabetic PCOS patients, Welt found that, while participants
did experience decreased testosterone levels and increased
ovulation, there was no indication that metformin improved
insulin sensitivity. 320 The research did find that metformin
improved glucose-mediated glucose disposal, acute insulin
response to glucose, and fasting glucose levels, suggesting that
metformin may have a direct effect on the ovaries, liver, and
muscles through mitochondrial complex I inhibition.321
Although there appears to be a wealth of research suggesting
that metformin is an effective treatment for PCOS, clinical
practice guidelines do not recommend metformin as a first-line
treatment for any aspect of PCOS.322 This primarily appears to
be due to the fact that there are more efficacious treatments
with fewer risks than those posed by metformin. 323 For example,
lifestyle modification is more beneficial in the improvement of
317 John E. Nestler & Daniela J. Jakubowicz, Lean Women with Polycystic Ovary
Syndrome Respond to Insulin Reduction with Decreases in Ovarian P450c17a
Activity and Serum Androgens, J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 4075,
4075, 4077(1997).
318 Cindy T. Pau, et al., Metformin Improves Glucose Effectiveness, Not Insulin
Sensitivity: Predicting Treatment Response in Women with Polycystic Ovary
Syndrome in an Open-Label, Interventional Study, 99 J. CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 1870, 1871 (2014).
319 Id.
320 Id. at 1874.
321 Id.
322 See Richard S. Legro et al., Diagnosis and Treatment of Polycystic Ovary
Syndrome: An Endocrine Society Clinical Practice Guideline, 98 J. CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM 4565 (2013).
323 Id. at 4580-82.
2018
57 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 20
impaired glucose tolerance. 324 In addition, the clinical practice
guidelines only suggest the use of metformin to treat infertility
when treatment with clomiphene alone is not sufficient. 325
Metformin is likewise only suggested as a second-line
treatment in adolescents; however, the clinical practice
guidelines do cite some studies suggesting that metformin
may be more beneficial to adolescent PCOS patients than
adult patients. 326
2. Cancer
Metformin's use in cancer therapy is associated both with its
ability to reduce insulin levels and with its effect on activating
anti-tumor protein production. 327 Beginning in the early 1990s,
clinical researchers at the University of Texas discovered the
relationship between insulin and insulin-like receptors in the
growth of colon cancer. 328 The discovery prompted researchers
worldwide to investigate the relationship between insulin,
insulin resistance, and various forms of cancer. 329 The
continuing results of that work have shown that many cancer
cells express insulin receptors 330 and have increased glucose
uptake. 331 Insulin uptake activates pathways that support
mRNA translation, cell survival, and cell proliferation. 332
Treatment with metformin lowers insulin levels and reduces
glucose production, which limits the activation of these
pathways 333 and which may slow the reproduction of cancer
cells. 334 Alternatively, metformin may increase cancer survival
324 Id. at 4580-81.
325 See id. at 4581.
326 Id. at 4582-83.
327 Ryan J.O. Dowling, et al., Understanding the Benefit of Metformin Use in Cancer
Treatment, 9 BMC MED. (2011),
http://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1741-7015-9-33
[https://perma.ce/S79D-T9DA].
328 Yan-Shi Guo et al., Characterization of Insulinlike Growth Factor I Receptors in
Human Colon Cancer, 102 GASTROENTEROLOGY 1101 (1992); Yan-Shi Guo et al.,
Insulinlike Growth Factor Binding Protein Modulates the Growth Response to
Insulinlike Growth Factor 1 by Human Gastric Cancer Cells, 104 GASTROENTEROLOGY
1595 (1993).
329 See Michael Pollack, Repurposing Biguanides to Target Energy Metabolism for Cancer
Treatment, 20 NATURE MED. 591, 592 (2014).
330 Id.
331 Alessandra Leone et al., New Perspective for an Old Diabetic Drug: Metformin as an
Anticancer Agent, 159 CANCER TREATMENT & RES. 355, 358 (2014).
332 Pollack, supra note 329.
333 Id.
334 See Leone et. al., supra note 331, at 367.
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through mTOR inhibition. 335 Whatever the mechanism, long-
term treatment of type II diabetes with metformin correlates
with a lower incidence of cancer. 336 In studies of diabetic and
non-diabetic cancer patients, metformin treatment appears to
improve overall cancer survival for both groups.33 7
In a 2005 paper published in the British Medical Journal,
researchers at the University of Dundee hypothesized that
metformin's mechanism of action activated the tumor
suppressing protein kinase LKB1. 338 In other words, the
association between metformin and improved cancer outcomes
was not just its effect on insulin or insulin receptors, but also
involved an independent effect on tumor-suppressing enzymes.
The paper prompted a wave of academic research in Canada, the
United States, and the United Kingdom, into not only the
association between metformin use and reduced cancer risk, but
also the extent and nature of its ability to suppress cancer cell
growth. 339 Josie Evans at Dundee and her research team
performed a population study using two databases, a diabetes
clinical information system (DARTS) and a database of
dispensed prescriptions (MEMO), to identify type II diabetes
patients, their treatments, and whether they were later
admitted to the hospital with a diagnosis for malignant
cancer.
340
Based on epidemiological studies identifying an increase in
cancer incidence in patients with type II diabetes, Bowker et al.
performed a subsequent population study, using the databases
of Saskatchewan Health to explore the role that antidiabetic
treatments may have on this relationship. 341 They found that
patients receiving metformin, either alone or in combination
with other drugs, for the treatment of type II diabetes were
335 Hua Xu et al., Validating Drug Repurposing Signals Using Electronic Health Records:
A Case Study of Metformin Associated with Reduced Cancer Mortality, J. AM. MED.
INFORMATICS ASSOC. 179 (2014).
336 See Leone et. al., supra note 331, at 363-66.
331 Xu et al., supra note 335, at 179.
338 See Josie M.M. Evans et al., Metformin and Reduced Risk of Cancer in Diabetic
Patients, 330 BMJ 1304 (2005).
339 Pamela J. Goodwin & Vuk Stambolic, Obesity and Insulin Resistance in Breast
Cancer Chemoprevention Strategies with a Focus on Metformin, 20 BREAST S31,
S32 (2011); see Evans et al., supra note 338.
340 Evans et al., supra note 338, at 1304.
341 Samantha L. Bowker et al., Increased Cancer-Related Mortality for Patients with
Type II Diabetes Who Use Sulfonylureas or Insulin, 29 DIABETES CARE 254 (2006).
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significantly less likely to die from cancer-related causes than
patients being treated with sulfonylureas or insulin. 342
In the United States, results from laboratory and limited
cohort studies both domestically and from British and Canadian
researchers have been extrapolated over larger populations
using databases assembled by major medical research
organizations. Sao Jiralerspong et al. at the Baylor School of
Medicine performed a retrospective study of 68 diabetic breast
cancer patients taking metformin during neoadjuvant
(administration of chemical agents before a main treatment)
chemotherapy (the metformin group), 87 diabetic patients not
taking metformin during neoadjuvant chemotherapy (the
nonmetformin group), and 2,374 nondiabetic breast cancer
patients (the nondiabetic group) using M.D. Anderson Cancer
Center's Breast Cancer Management System Database. 343 They
found that diabetic patients being treated with metformin in
addition to their other neoadjuvant therapy had significantly
higher rates of response than diabetic patients who were treated
with other antidiabetic therapies.344
Building on this research, Patricia Goodwin and colleagues
at the University of Toronto administered metformin to non-
diabetic patients with recently diagnosed breast cancer prior to
tumor excision. 345 Participants received metformin for a mean of
eighteen days, continuing until the evening before surgery. 346
Goodwin's study not only found a decrease in tumor proliferation
following metformin treatment, but also an increase in apoptosis.
347 A collaboration between researchers at the University of
Texas, Vanderbilt, and Mayo Clinic linked two large electronic
health record databases from Vanderbilt University Medical
Center and Mayo Clinic with their tumor registries, and
constructed a cohort including 32,415 adults with a cancer
342 Id. at 255-56. Bowker et al. admit that population studies using administrative
databases often fail to account for important clinical information such as glycemic
control, weight, BMI, or smoking status.
343 Sao Jiralerspong et al., Metformin and Pathologic Complete Responses to
Neoadjuvant Chemotherapy in Diabetic Patients with Breast Cancer, 20 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3297, 3298 (2009).
344 Id. at 3300.
345 Saroj Niraula et al., Metformin in Early Breast Cancer: A Prospective Window of
Opportunity Neoadjuvant Study, 135 BREAST CANCER RES. & TREATMENT 821
(2012).
346 Id. at 824.
341 Pamela J. Goodwin, Insulin in the Adjuvant Breast Cancer Setting: A Novel
Therapeutic Target for Lifestyle and Pharmacologic Interventions?, 26 J.
CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 833 (2008); Pamela J. Goodwin, Metformin in Breast Cancer:
Time for Action, 27 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 3271-3273 (2009); see Saroj Niraula et
al., supra note 345, at 826; see also Jiralerspong et al., supra note 343, at 3297.
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diagnosis at Vanderbilt and 79,258 cancer patients at Mayo
from 1995 to 2010. 348 Using automated informatics methods,
they identified type II diabetes patients within the cancer cohort
and determined their drug exposure information, as well as
other covariates such as smoking status. 349 They evaluated
health records for all-cause mortality and patients' metformin
exposure, adjusted for age at diagnosis, sex, race, body mass
index, tobacco use, insulin use, and cancer type. 350 Among all
Vanderbilt cancer patients, metformin was associated with a
22% decrease in overall mortality compared to other oral
hypoglycemic medications, and with a 39% decrease compared to
type II diabetes patients on insulin only. 351 Diabetic patients on
metformin also had a 23% improved survival compared with
non-diabetic patients.352 The associations were replicated using
Mayo Clinic's electronic health records data. Many site-specific
cancers, including breast, colorectal, lung, and prostate,
demonstrated reduced mortality with metformin use in at least
one electronic health record. Metformin has been associated
with positive outcomes or cell inhibition in colorectal, pancreatic,
hepatocellular, lung, 353 prostate, endometrial, and ovarian
cancers, as well as gliomas. 354
Like other potential uses, the use of metformin to treat
cancer needs more exploration to answer several questions. 355
First, metformin's exact mechanism of effect on cancer cells is
currently unknown. 356 Second, research has uncovered a
generalized anticancer effect, but metformin may be most
effective against certain types of cancer 357 such as cancers of the
liver and pancreas. 358 Finally, cancer treatment may require
higher doses and different methods of delivery than those used
to treat diabetes; oral use may not result in sufficient
concentration of metformin to achieve a satisfactory clinical
result.359 It is also possible that the other biguanides, such as





353 Ana Elisa Lohmann & Pamela J. Goodwin, Hype Versus Hope: Metformin and
Vitamin D as Anticancer Agents, AM. SOC'Y CLINICAL ONCOLOGY EDUC. BOOK e69-
e74 (2014).
354 Ryan J.O. Dowling et al., Understanding the Benefit of Metformin Use in Cancer
Treatment, 9 BMC MED. 2 (2011).
355 Pollack, supra note 329, at 593.
356 See Xu et al., supra note 335, at 184.
357 Id.
358 Leone et al., supra note 331.
359 Pollack, supra note 329, at 592.
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phenformin, may be more effective for cancer treatment because
they are less dependent on active transport, addressing some of
the potential dosing and delivery issues. 360 Although other
biguanides are more toxic than metformin, they still have a
lower risk of serious side effects than most conventional cancer
treatments. 36 1
3. Non-Alcoholic Fatty Liver Disease
The use of metformin to treat non-alcoholic fatty liver disease
is attributable to clinicians at Johns Hopkins, who prescribed
metformin to treat the condition notwithstanding its
contraindication for patients with liver disease. 36 2 Nonalcoholic
fatty liver disease is a term used to describe the accumulation of
fat in the liver of people who drink little or no alcohol. 363
Nonalcoholic fatty liver disease is common and, for most people,
causes no signs and symptoms and no complications. 36 4 But in
some people with nonalcoholic fatty liver disease, the fat that
accumulates can cause inflammation and scarring in the liver.36 5
At its most severe, nonalcoholic fatty liver disease can progress
to liver failure. 366
Non-alcoholic fatty liver disease is a common condition in
patients with type II diabetes and insulin resistance. 36 7 Other
than interest in using metformin to treat fatty liver disease,
there is no pharmacological agent known to prevent or reverse
fatty liver disease. 368 Because it is often associated with obesity
360 Samuel E. Weinberg & Navdeep S. Chandel, Targeting Mitochondria Metabolism for
Cancer Therapy, 11 NATURE CHEMICAL BIOLOGY 9, 9-15 (2015).
361 Pollack, supra note 329.
362 Hui Zhi Lin et al., Metformin Reverses Fatty Liver Disease in Obese, Leptin-
deficient Mice, 6 NATURE MED. 998, 998 (2000) ("Recently, some clinicians noted
improved liver test abnormalities in a few patients with fatty liver disease that
were treated with metformin. However, because lactic acidosis is a rare
complication of metformin, liver disease is often considered to be a
contraindication for metformin therapy...").
363 Nonalcoholic Fatty Liver Disease, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/nonalcoholic-fatty-liver-diseas e/basics /definition/con -
20027761[https://perma.cc/27B3-MHHS].






367 Lin et. al., supra note 362.
368 Treatment and Drugs: Fatty Liver Disease, MAYO CLINIC
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/nonalcoholic-fatty-liver-
disease/basics/treatment/con-20027761 [https://perma.cc/G53B-NUAZ] ("No
FDA-approved drug treatment exists for nonalcoholic fatty liver disease, but a
few drugs are being studied with promising results.").
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and type II diabetes, treatment is primarily focused on weight
management through diet and exercise. 36 9 However, this is not
always sufficient to improve outcomes in fatty liver disease
patients, 370 and it is not helpful for normal-weight patients. 371
Based on a strong association between fatty liver disease and
hyperinsulinemia and insulin resistance in patients, 372 Lin et al.
tested metformin's effectiveness in obese, hyperinsulinemic, and
insulin-resistant mice with fatty liver disease. 373 They found
that both a combination of caloric restriction and metformin and
caloric restriction alone led to improvement in liver enlargement,
but the effect was greater with metformin treatment. 374 In
addition, metformin treatment virtually eliminated fat
accumulation in the liver, whereas calorie restriction alone had
no effect on fat accumulation. 375
Building on Lin's work, Guilio Marchesini and his team at
Italy's University of Bologna completed the first human study
using metformin to treat fatty liver disease. 376 They
administered metformin to non-diabetic patients with fatty liver
disease for four months. 377 In addition, patients were
encouraged to reduce their lipid and non-complex carbohydrate
intake and to increase their physical activity. 378 Following
treatment, patients who received metformin in addition to diet
and exercise demonstrated a greater decrease in alanine
transaminase concentration as well as liver volume. 379
Participants receiving metformin also had significant increases
in insulin sensitivity. 380 Marchesini et al. concluded that diet
and exercise combined with metformin was more effective at
treating fatty liver disease than diet and exercise alone. 381
Marchesini's study spurred a number of small adult trials as
well as research into therapies for children and adolescents.
Academic physicians at the University of Colorado-Denver
developed a pediatric study for metformin therapy, because
rising pediatric obesity rates corresponded to increases in the
369 Id.
370 Id.
371 Giulio Marchesini et al., Metformin in Non-Alcoholic Steatohepatitis, 358
LANCET 893, 893 (2001).
372 Lin et al., supra note 362, at 998.
373 Id. at 1001.
374 Id. at 998.
375 Id. at 998-99.
376 Marchesini et al., supra note 371, at 894.
377 Id. at 893-94.
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incidence of fatty liver disease among children and
adolescents.382 The shortage of effective treatments for fatty
liver disease is particularly troubling in this context for two
reasons: (1) fatty liver disease is more likely to progress to
cirrhosis and fibrosis in youth, and (2) lifestyle changes are more
difficult to sustain in adolescents. 383 They administered
metformin to obese, non-diabetic twelve-to-eighteen-year-old
participants who either exhibited existing fatty liver disease or
who were at risk for fatty liver disease.38 4 After six months of
treatment, participants with fatty liver disease showed
significant decreases in fasting insulin and fatty liver score, and
fatty liver disease resolved completely in several subjects. 38 5 No
participants without fatty liver disease at baseline developed
fatty liver disease while undergoing metformin treatment.38 6
To date, there are no approved drugs to treat non-alcoholic
fatty liver disease and, based on these studies, metformin is
widely prescribed off-label to treat the condition.387
V. THE REPURPOSING OF METFORMIN AND THE CURRENT
INCENTIVE DEBATE
Metformin therefore represents exactly the kind of
problem current scholars and industry advocates say occurs with
drug repurposing. Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck KGaA sit
upon a trove of consumption, off-label prescription,
pharmacological, toxicological, and clinical trial data related to
metformin. That data may potentially support new drug
applications for the wide range of indications that have a long
history of successful use, like polycystic ovary syndrome, and
new indications, like the cancers for which metformin appears to
be a promising therapy. Moreover, these companies already
have dedicated marketing and promotion staff to metformin who
could, with relative ease, market it for other purposes. The
reason the companies are not contributing their knowledge nor
382 Kristen J. Nadeau et al., Treatment of Non-Alcoholic Fatty Liver Disease with
Metformin Versus Lifestyle Intervention in Insulin-Resistant Adolescents, 10
PEDIATRIC DIABETES 5, 5 (2008).
383 Id. at 6.
384 Id.
385 Id. at 9.
386 Id.
387 Ligong Chen et al., OCTI Is a High-Capacity Thiamine Transporter that Regulates
Hepatic Steatosis and Is a Target of Metformin, 111 PROC. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. 9983
(2014); Press Release, Intercept Receives Breakthrough Therapy Designation from
FDA for Obeticholic Acid for Nonalcoholic Steatohepatitis (NASH) with Liver Fibrosis,




attempting to develop new indications, the argument goes, is
because doing so would result in no benefit to the firms. 388
Physicians would simply prescribe metformin for an alternative,
off-patent or off-exclusivity indication. Indeed, because so many
of metformin's uses are related to patients with comorbidities-
more than one illness-that seems probable 8 9
A. Metformin Ascended as a Repurposing Candidate
through Governmental and Academic Investments
Yet without industry investment (Bristol-Myers Squibb has
supported studies for metformin for its primary indication-type
II diabetes), metformin became a breakthrough therapy for
polycystic ovary syndrome and nonalcoholic fatty liver disease,
and "numerous early stage clinical trials are currently under
way to investigate metformin's potential to prevent an array of
cancers". For polycystic ovary syndrome, metformin's promise
was discovered as most repurposed drugs have been discovered:
through serendipity. For nonalcoholic fatty liver disease,
researchers prescribed metformin for patients that had a
contraindicated condition-liver disease-because they
understood how metformin worked in diabetes patients and why
it might work for nonalcoholic fatty liver disease. Metformin's
potential for cancer prevention and treatment-including early
stage clinical trials-was similarly driven by academic
researchers and financial support from the National Cancer
Institute and the National Institute for Diabetes and Digestive
and Kidney Diseases. 390
This finding is consistent with analyses undertaken over a
wider range of breakthrough drugs. 391 In a recent study, Aaron
Kesselheim, Yongtian Tina Tan, and Jerry Avorn determined
that of twenty-six transformative drugs approved between 1984
and 2009, a complex set of relationships between academic
researchers, industry, and governmental funders explained the
emergence of breakthrough therapies; nine drugs were
repurposed.392 Their findings at the very least suggest caution in
388 See Graham Rena et al., Molecular Mechanisms of Action of Metformin: Old or New
Insights, 56 DIABETOLOGY 1898, 1904 (2013) ("What about new drugs? At first sight,
the impressive safety profile and low cost of metformin itself might discourage
pharmaceutical companies from developing drugs that act in a similar manner.").
389 See id.
3.90 Metformin: Can a Diabetes Drug Help Prevent Cancer?, NATL CANCER INST.,
http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/research/metformin
[https://perma.cc/5PF4-9Y9B].
391 Arti Rai & Rebecca Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and the Process
of Biomedicine, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 289 (2003).
392 Kesselheim et al., supra note 43, at 396.
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determining which actors in the health system, operating under
different incentives, are best placed to promote repurposing
activity.
B. Using Currently Proposed Market Exclusivity
Incentives Would Not Have Resulted in Metformin's Ascent
as a Rep urposed Drug
1. Clinical Trials for Alternative Uses May
Undermine Metformin's Profitability for Its
Primary Indication
Conversely, it is not clear that extending market exclusivity
incentives in the hopes of generating more repurposing
activity-especially Phase II and Phase III clinical trials-would
generate the kinds of investments advocates predict. First, there
is a chance that additional Phase II or Phase III trials for
alternative indications may expose adverse events-like cardiac
events-that would negatively impact Bristol-Myers Squibb's
and Merck KGaA's global market for the drug. 393 Because type
II diabetes is associated with four times greater risk of
developing cardiovascular disease compared with nondiabetic
patients, extensive clinical trials for alternative indications are
likely to bring greater clarity as to the relationship between
metformin-alone or in combination with other drugs-with
cardiac events, including the possibility of a negative
relationship. 394
In a meta-analysis of randomized controlled trials evaluating
metformin efficacy (in studies of metformin versus diet alone,
versus a placebo, and versus no treatment; metformin as an add-
on therapy; and metformin withdrawal) against cardiovascular
morbidity or mortality in patients with type II diabetes,
researchers at the Universite de Poiters concluded that
"[a]lthough metformin is considered the gold standard, its
393 Thayer, supra note 24 ("Other companies shy away from repurposing efforts after
approval because of what they might uncover. Merck & Co.'s experience with Vioxx is
a cautionary tale, points out David P. Cavalla, founder of Cambridge, England-
based Numedicus, which provides services around repurposing. After getting approval
for the drug as an analgesic, Merck began testing it for treating colon polyps.
Cardiovascular issues that arose had to be reported to regulators and scuttled the
blockbuster entirely.").
394 Erin L. St. Onge et al., A Review of Cardiovascular Risks Associated with Medications
Used to Treat Type-2 Diabetes Mellitus, 34 PHARmAcY & THERAPEUTICS 368 (2009).
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benefit/risk ratio remains uncertain. We cannot exclude a 25%
reduction or a 31% increase in all-cause mortality."395
There is therefore a strong incentive for firms to avoid
additional knowledge of metformin risks given its already
lucrative status.
2. Current Proposals Would Encourage Firms to
Explore Only One (Potentially Suboptimal)
Alternative Use
Second, even if product liability hesitations were overcome,
the incentives now proposed might not be enough to move
metformin into clinical trials for alternative uses. Those
incentives, advocated by members of Congress like Orrin Hatch
and industry leaders like Don Frail, include twelve to fifteen
years of market exclusivity on the entire drug for a new use that
meets an unmet medical need. Consider a law that creates a
class of drugs designated as "dormant therapies," new drugs or
new biological products made the subject of a request for
designation in compliance with the legislation. 396 The
assignment of dormant therapy would be given to a drug or new
biological product that had been determined to have
insufficient patent protection and that meets an unmet medical
need, improves outcomes, or reduces risk compared to existing
treatments. In its request for designation of dormant therapy,
the manufacturer would provide a list of all patents and
applications for patents to which the manufacturer has rights,
and must agree to waive those rights in order to receive the
designation. 397 The law, as it was proposed, would provide
fifteen years' data exclusivity to encourage manufacturers to
investigate a dormant therapy to determine if it could prevent,
slow the progression of, or cure diseases. The Secretary of
Health and Human Services would be required to make its
determinations available to the public, and could not approve a
generic for a drug or biosimilar or a biological product that has
the same active ingredient as a drug that has been designated a
dormant therapy. 398
Under that regime, if Bristol-Myers Squibb or Merck KGaA
obtained a new use approval for metformin for polycystic ovary
syndrome or cancer, it would then be able to re-impose the high
395 R~my Boussageon et al., Reappraisal of Metformin Efficacy in the Treatment of
Type 2 Diabetes: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 9 PLOS MED.
e1001204 (2012).
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prices it charged for metformin for all uses, including type II
diabetes, with severe effects on the millions of people who now
take the drug because it is incredibly affordable to do so. 399 More
importantly, why then would it undertake the costs of clinical
trials for metformin's other uses if it exhausted the benefit of the
law with the first dormant therapy designation that satisfied the
statutory requirement? In the aggregate, such a regime would
reduce repurposing activity.
One of the emerging lessons from the Orphan Drug Act
experience is that once an exclusivity designation is authorized
under law, it will tend to attract more research and investment,
even when the designation results in the raised cost of
previously inexpensive medications. 400 Indeed, as this Article
and substantial medical evidence shows, the primary incentive
problem is the funding of Phase II and Phase III clinical trials
for new indications, for which an alternative reimbursement
structure might be constructed without giving market
exclusivity with unpredictable effects. 40 1
C. Creating Statutory Market Exclusivity Extensions for
New Uses That Are Not Absolute Would be Vulnerable to
Off-Label Prescription
Even should more effective use patents or market exclusivity
mechanisms be adopted to encourage new use approvals, there
are significant practical limitations. The uses for which
metformin has shown therapeutic promise could easily justify a
physician's prescription as part of a relatively minor
intervention. So even if changes in the law allowed Bristol-
Myers Squibb to obtain market exclusivity for metformin to
treat polycystic ovary syndrome, nonalcoholic fatty liver disease,
or breast cancer, prescribers could still circumvent that market
399 Michael T. Eaddy et al., How Patient Cost-Sharing Trends Affect Adherence and
Outcomes, 37 PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 45 (2012); Lisa M. Hess et al., Measurement
of Adherence in Pharmacy Administrative Databases: A Proposal for Standard
Definitions and Preferred Measures. 40 ANNALS PHARMACOTHERAPY 1280 (2006);
Ramin Mojtabai & Mark Olfson, Medication Costs, Adherence, and Health Outcomes
Among Medicare Beneficiaries. 22 HEALTH AFF. 220 (2003); Rishi Sikka et al.,
Estimating Medication Adherence Using Administrative Claims Data. 11 AM. J.
MANAGED CARE 449 (2005).
400 Letter from Orrin Hatch, Chuck Grassley, & Tom Cotton, U.S. Senators, to Hon. Gene
L. Dodaro, Comptroller Gen. of U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (Mar. 3, 2017),
https:Hkaiserhealthnews.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/gao-request-oda-signed1-002.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SPG9-YRHP].
401 Paul & Lewis-Hall, supra note 54, at 187.
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exclusivity by instructing use of metformin for short-term
weight loss as part of a broader lifestyle intervention.4 02
D. Additional Market Exclusivities May Undermine
Industry-Academic Collaboration
Repurposing has often been accomplished through industry-
university collaborations, especially when industry-based
researchers encounter unusual results in the course of
investigating a drug candidate for a specific purpose and then
reach out to academic experts to help them explain the
phenomena. It is possible that eliminating the uncertainty
surrounding method-of-use patents, extending market
exclusivity for drugs approved through the section 505(b)(2)
process, or even off-label prescription as discussed below may
facilitate more of these partnerships and therefore more
repurposed candidates. In the current system, there is
overwhelming consensus that substantial transaction costs
stand in the way of effective partnerships between large
pharmaceutical firms and smaller biotechnology players,
universities, and public research institutions. 403 With
entitlements to intellectual property clearly delineated, the
argument goes, large pharmaceutical firms would be positioned
to control research and development partnerships so as to
protect lucrative IP assets while licensing aspects of the
research and development process to the entities best suited to
undertake their respective tasks.40 4
402 SARAH H. BEACHY ET AL., DRUG REPURPOSING AND REPOSITIONING: WORKSHOP SUMMARY
47 (2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih. gov/books/NBK202175/pdf/TOC.pdf
[https://perma.ce/FM6L-E2Y3].
403 Ian Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Public-Private Interaction in Pharmaceutical
Research, 93 PROC. NATL AcAD. Sci. 12725 (1996); Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit
Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology
Transfer, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1503, 1534 (2012); Michael D. Rawlins, Cutting the Cost of
Drug Development?, 3 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 360 (2004).
404 Katherine J. Strandburg, Intellectual Property at the Boundary (N.Y.U. Public Law &
Legal Theory Working Papers, Paper No. 432, 2013),
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1431 &context=nyu plltwp
[https://perma.cc/T7XY-94YJ] ("Of course, intellectual property rights may be more or
less well-suited to different creative enterprises. If creative outputs are well-
delineated, with relatively well-understood potential embodiments and relatively
predictable downstream co-mingling, the legally-defined contours of patent or
copyright may 'fit' relatively well. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case, meaning that,
despite its potential to solve various incentive problems, intellectual property is a
costly system for structuring creative interactions."); COMMISSION EUR. COMMUNITIES,
VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES FOR UNIVERSITIES AND OTHER RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS TO
IMPROVE THEIR LINKS WITH INDUSTRY ACROSS EUROPE 10-12 (2007).
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While it is an open question, there are good reasons to doubt
that greater control over a drug's marketability will not
encourage effective knowledge sharing.405 Peter Lee has argued
in the context of Myriad Genetics' BRCA1 and BRCA2
diagnostic tests that its selective control over the genes (before
that control was deemed partially invalid by the U.S. Supreme
Court) deterred rather than encouraged research into both the
underlying genes as well as potentially improved diagnostics. 406
The problem of firms and their internal researchers having
discrete disease portfolios and therefore limiting new use
investigations to within those controlling schema would appear
to be steepened rather than resolved by creating incentives to
keep drugs in house. 407
E. Additional Market Exclusivities Will Unavoidably
Implicate Socially Undesirable Evergreening Strategies
Between the current Hatch-Waxman regime and the kind of
market exclusivity envisioned under many recent legislative
proposals is the possibility of use-by-use determinations as now
undertaken by the FDA for new drug applications that cite
literature (published versions of studies) or a previously
405 Liza S. Vertinsky, Patents, Partnerships, and the Precompetitive Collaboration Myth,
48 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 1509, 1540 (2015) ("The incentive problems that patents create
for partnerships also lead to higher transaction costs in the negotiation of partnership
agreements, particularly provisions concerning intellectual property ownership and
use, and increase the possibility that no agreement will be reached").
406 Peter Lee, The Supreme Court's Myriad Effects on Scientific Research: Definitional
Fluidity and the Legal Construction of Nature, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1077, 1083-84
(2015) ("Myriad's narrow conception of 'research' use, however, created difficulties for
scientists seeking to conduct BRCA research. In May 1998, Myriad Genetics accused
University of Pennsylvania cancer researchers Dr. Arupa Ganguly and Dr. Haig
Kazazian of infringing five of its patents. Myriad offered the researchers a license, but
it was 'of very limited scope,' as it would have prevented the scientists from
completing diagnostic testing services for BRCA1 or conducting comprehensive
research on the gene. Ultimately, the researchers ceased 'all BRCA1 and BRCA2
testing, whether for research or clinical purposes.' In particular, the inability to share
diagnostic results with test subjects made it more difficult for scientists to enlist
patients in research studies. This restriction especially discouraged the most
important potential research subjects-those with a family history of breast cancer-
from participating in studies. Although Myriad offered to perform full-gene 'research'
sequencing at its own laboratory for a discount, the fee was still substantial.
Furthermore, the requirement of submitting samples to Myriad would have foreclosed
researchers from utilizing their own preferred sequencing techniques. Commentators
suggest that chilled research on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes may have delayed
important discoveries, such as the role of 'big deletions' in developing breast cancer.").
407 Thomas P. Stossel, Regulating Academic-Industrial Research Relationships Solving
Problems or Stifling Progress?, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1060 (2005); see Kendall W. Artz
& Thomas H. Brush, Asset Specificity, Uncertainty and Relational Norms: An
Examination of Coordination Costs in Collaborative Strategic Alliances, 41 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 337 (2000).
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approved product. 408 When they work, they effectively give
pharmaceutical firms an incentive to evergreen their drugs
through incremental improvements that may nevertheless
qualify as new uses. That is what Bristol-Myers Squibb
endeavored to do with the introduction of Glucophage XR and
Glucovance, as well as its investments in earning an additional
pediatric indication and corresponding six-month exclusivity
window. A 2011 paper in Nature Biotechnology suggests that
pharmaceutical firms' strategy is conscientiously oriented
toward filing new drug applications and patents so as to
maximize exclusivity windows. 409 While certain definitions and
designations may help draw the line between a meaningful
"breakthrough" therapy and a relatively minor adjustment to
dose, drug combination, or method of administration, any
additional categorization will open additional avenues for firms
to claim market exclusivities that may not generate the social
benefits those exclusivities were intended to achieve.
In short, deploying the kinds of market exclusivity incentives
now being advocated may result in less repurposing activity,
including reduced opportunity for serendipitous discovery and
revelations made through academic practice, even if it does
increase industry activity.
F. Giving Pharmaceutical Firms Access to Physician
Prescription Practices Will Generate as Much or More Off-
Label Promotion Activity and Compromise the Physician-
Patient Relationship
Ben Roin argues that the problem of new uses is not an
exclusivity problem, but an information problem-firms simply
need to know when physicians are prescribing off-label, so that
they can enforce existing exclusivities under law. 410 Monitoring
prescribers' off-label activity, he argues, could be solved by
giving pharmaceutical firms access to patient health records
(with personally identifiable information redacted) so they could
effectively price their products fully informed by prescription
practices. 411 Insurers and pharmaceutical benefit management
firms routinely require doctors to report a patient's diagnosis
and health records before the insurance company will authorize
408 Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 720 (2005).
409 Gaudry, supra note 102, at 876-78.
410 Roin, supra note 26.
411 Id.
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payment for expensive brand name drugs. 412 By granting
pharmaceutical companies limited access to patient records in
order to check the accuracy of reported diagnoses and
prescriptions, they would be able to charge payers when doctors
prescribe an old drug for a new use or require pharmacists to
dispense the expensive brand name drug rather than a generic
when it is prescribed for patented indications.4 1 3 Although this
would require some expansion of the Health Information
Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), Roin argues it
could be a workable solution to increase the profitability of
repurposed drugs.
Like market exclusivity approaches, however, giving large
pharmaceutical firms access to electronic medical records for
purposes of monitoring off-label activity confronts its own set of
practical limitations. First, it is not clear that pharmaceutical
benefit management firms-insurers' agents-are particularly
good at using "medically necessary" limitations to affect
prescription behavior. 414 Roin cites pharmaceutical benefit
management companies themselves for the proposition that they
have "had great success at preventing payments for drugs not
prescribed for medically accepted indications," but academic
analyses, supported by judicial decisions, have largely
determined that "this tactic has met with limited success. ' 415
Politically speaking, the off-label system largely drives down (at
least direct) costs setting up a confrontation between the
interests of payers and pharmaceutical firms in any effort to
amend HIPAA which Roin's proposal requires. 416
Even assuming the proposal were practically and politically
viable, the effect on the drug repurposing ecosystem would be
inevitably profound. Pharmaceutical firms would not limit their
use of the prescribing information for pricing, and there would
be no effective way to make them do so. Now-unconstitutional
legislative efforts by physicians to limit pharmaceutical
company influence have been based on the combination of data
and soft coercion that physicians both resent and worry may
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 Katherine T. Adams, The Off-Label Conundrum, 3 BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 27
(2006) ("In fact, Pezalla, at Prescription Solutions, estimates that at least half the
pharmacy benefit manager's total reimbursement load is for off-label usage.").
415 Abbott & Ayres, supra note 186, at 392.
416 Mark Gaynor et al., A Tale of Two Standards: Strengthening HIPAA Security
Regulations Using the PCI-DSS, 4 HEALTH SYSTEMS 111 (2015) (noting the general
difficulty with amending HIPAA).
Drug Repurposing Ecosystem
affect their patient care practices. 417 Pharmaceutical firms
already capture revenues from alternative uses through their
off-label marketing activity. Giving pharmaceutical firms access
to physician prescription practices would just increase the
revenue stream flowing from off-label marketing practices and
would potentially distort the kind of clinical off-label practice
that has given rise to new use breakthroughs, to say nothing of
patient care generally. 418
Thalidomide was initially licensed for the treatment of
erythema nodosum leprosum in 1998, and it was not until 2006
that thalidomide was approved for the treatment of myeloma. 419
Yet, in this time period, more than 720,000 thalidomide
prescriptions were written, with only 0.1% of prescriptions for
the label indication of erythema nodosum leprosum. 420 The
initial off-label use of thalidomide for the treatment of myeloma
after approval for leprosy highlights a broader issue in drug
repurposing related to the need to obtain a labeled indication. 421
The potential new use for an old drug may be quickly and widely
disseminated through publications and presentations. 422 If the
drug is currently available in an appropriate formulation, off-
417 Tamara Piety, A Necessary Cost of Freedom?, 64 ALA. L. REV. (2012) ("Pharmaceutical
companies pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to third-party firms that gather sales
data from the nation's pharmacy chains; reps get detailed reports informing them how
many prescriptions--of their own drugs, as well as those of their competitors-each
doctor has written in a particular week. This allows the rep who discovers that a
promise hasn't been honored to police the promise: 'Now, Doctor, last month you
agreed to try Zithromax in your next ten otitis media patients. What stopped you from
doing so?' . . . . IMS Health, Inc., the plaintiff in the Sorrell case, is one such
prescription drug information intermediary. It gathers information from pharmacies
about the prescriptions doctors write. Although the patients' names in the data are
protected in accordance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPPA), prescribers' names are not scrubbed. Thus, IMS and other PDIIs can
organize the data by physician and by drug, so it is possible to see what drugs, and
how much of each, every doctor is prescribing. Companies like IMS Health then buy
lists of licensed physicians from the AMA and cross-reference these records against
the records obtained from the pharmacies, analyze and summarize all of this data,
and then sell it back to interested parties." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
418 Id. ("Predictably, many doctors feel this practice is incredibly intrusive. As one
witness testified, having the detailer know so much information about his prescription
practices 'puts me at a disadvantage that I'm not comfortable being at.' Moreover, the
evidence adduced in the cases litigating statutes like that of Vermont demonstrates
that the purpose of data mining is to stimulate the sales of brand-name drugs. Studies
suggest that 'detailing has "a significant effect on physician prescription behavior."').
419 Sukhai et al., supra note 118.
420 Id.
421 Id.
422 Abbott & Ayres, supra note 186, at 390 ("Off-label drug use ... may also serve as a
pathway to innovation. Off-label drug use can provide valuable data about the effects
of the drug for different conditions and populations, and this data can then be used to
inform future clinical practice.").
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label prescribing could lead to wide adoption of this therapy in
the absence of formal regulatory approval.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that current solutions to the drug
repurposing problem focus on market exclusivity incentives
without fully exploring the interruptions those incentives may
cause in the drug repurposing ecosystem. That ecosystem, while
certainly dependent in part on innovation driven within and by
large pharmaceutical firms, is equally or more supported by
serendipitous observations by treating physicians, a complex
and opaquely regulated off-label prescription system and, to an
extent not effectively assessed in the current literature, patients'
access to affordable medicines and product liability concerns
held by innovator pharmaceutical firms. This ecosystem is
complex and global, but its focus of activity is not equally
distributed. Even breakthroughs for metformin use initially
discovered in other countries were rapidly developed and more
effectively exploited in the United States. The experience with
metformin suggests that new-use incentives may not be used
where proponents now imagine they will do the most work, and
may in fact erect additional barriers to patient access to
medicines while complicating academic research efforts. Finally,
industry appears to be undertaking repurposing activity as a
natural result of a changing market; therefore, additional
incentives would reward work that was going to be undertaken
anyway. Before there is determined to be a drug repurposing
problem, the scope and magnitude of that problem must be
better understood and solutions developed that are sensitive to
the successes the current system now achieves.
